The Manifesto of 1958: A Statement to the World on Behalf of Confucianism by Simionato, Alice
The Manifesto of 1958:
A Statement to the World on Behalf of Confucianism
Alice Simionato
Supervised by
Dr. Paul van Els
Research Master Degree in Asian Studies,
Leiden Institute for Area Studies,
Leiden University.
Academic Year 2017/2018
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Paul van Els, for all of his useful comments
during the writing process of this research and, more importantly, for his patience. 
I  would also like to thank everyone who, in one way or another,  supported this
project throughout my studies. In particular: my mother Mariantonietta and sister Katy,
who constantly encouraged me; my first mentor, Antonio, who instilled in me the passion
for Philosophy; and Karim, who has always found a way to be by my side.
In addition, I am grateful to the audience of the conference “Creating a Philosophy
for  the  Future”  (University  of  Macau,  November  2017)  and  the  audience  of  the
Northeast/Midwest  Conference  on  Chinese  Thought  (University  of  Connecticut,  April
2018)  for  having provided useful  comments and feedback on an earlier  version of  the
fourth chapter of this thesis.
Brussels, 4 December 2018.
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Blending Tradition and Modernity: Considerations on Conservatism
in Republican China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
1.1 Cultural Conservatism in Republican China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
1.2 The Case of New Confucianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
1.3 The Debate on Science and Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
2.  A Brief History of the Manifesto: Authors, Conception, and 
Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1 The Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Conception and Publication of the Manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
2.3 Reception of the Manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3. Overview of the Content of the Manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4. Whose Confucianism? Defining the Philosophical Framework of
the Manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1 理 li: an Ordered Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 心性 xinxing: the Mind and the Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
4.3 天人合一 tian ren he yi: unity of Heaven and Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
5. Confucian and European Rationalism: a Cross-cultural Dialogue . . 72
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1 Immanence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
5.2 Parallelism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.3 Unity of Heaven and Man, Unity of Substance and Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4 Extension of Knowledge and its Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
Introduction
In 1958, four Chinese scholars – Zhang Junmai  张君劢 ,  Tang Junyi  唐君毅 ,  Xu
Fuguan  徐復觀 ,  and Mou Zongsan  牟宗三– published in  Hong Kong and Taiwan a
document entitled 为中国文化敬告世界人士宣言–我们对中国学术研究及中国文化与世界文化前
途之共同认识  (Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie  renshi  xuanyan – Women dui
Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu  ji  Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie  wenhua qiantu  zhi  gongtong
renshi). Four years later, in 1962, the four scholars translated the document into English,
with  the  title  “A  Manifesto  on  the  Reappraisal  of  Chinese  Culture  –  Our  Joint
Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook.” The purpose
of the document, as stated in its preamble, is to bring about a better understanding of
Chinese thought in Western Academia; in particular, according to the authors, the main
road to be taken in studying Chinese culture is understanding Chinese philosophy as the
core  of  Chinese  thought,  which  nucleus  is  to  be  found  in  the  doctrine  of  'Chinese
Rationalism' (中國心性之学  Zhongguo  xinxing zhi  xue, literally meaning 'The study of
heart-mind  and  nature'). Philosophically,  Rationalism  is  usually  used  in  reference  to
European thinkers of the 17th and 18th century, and therefore it seems surprising to find the
same term used in reference to Chinese Philosophy. The aim of this work is to provide the
reader with a comprehensive account of the philosophical significance of the Manifesto; I
argue  that  the  terminology  employed  by  the  authors  in  the  English  version  of  the
document to explain  xinxing zhi xue does not represent a case of poor translation, but
rather the attempt to establish a cross-cultural  dialogue between Chinese and Western
philosophy with regard to notions of Reason and rationality.
In Western Academia, the document at issue is generally known as the Manifesto of
New  Confucians;  this  is  because  the  four  authors  were  advocates  of  the  revival  of
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Confucianism in the 20th century – known as 'New Confucianism'. Perhaps for this reason,
the Manifesto has never been researched independently, but has always been considered as
part of studies on this philosophical  and cultural  movement.  Because of  the lack of in
depth  research  on  the  document,  in  turn,  scholars  have  interpreted  the  text  as  an
exemplification of cultural conservatism resulting from China's Republican period (1912-
1949). This  interpretation,  however  far  from wrong,  does  not  account for  the  authors'
interest in specifically addressing Western academics and, in addition to that, it cannot
account for  the  philosophical  richness  of  the  Manifesto.  Since,  as  mentioned earlier,  a
general and comprehensive account of the document as considered on its own has not been
produced yet, the first part of this work (consisting of chapter one, two, and three) displays
a strong descriptive component, while the second part (consisting of chapter four and five)
provides an analysis of the philosophical framework of the Manifesto. The research has
been conducted by means of comparative discourse analysis of the Chinese and English
text, both of which are considered as primary sources. Apart from these, since the stated
purpose of the Manifesto was to bring about a better understanding of Chinese thought in
Western Academia,  I  decided to  base  this  research  on secondary  sources  published in
English.
As a general rule, a clear understanding of any philosophical system or tradition
requires a cultural and historical contextualization of its development. For this reason, the
first  chapter is  devoted to provide a general  framework of  different  models  of  cultural
conservatism in Republican China, with particular consideration for New Confucianism. In
addition to that,  the chapter also provides an account of what is known as the debate
between Science and Metaphysics of 1923, which has been of fundamental importance in
the early philosophical formation of the main figure behind the issuing of the Manifesto,
namely,  Zhang Junmai.  The second chapter describes the conception of the document,
provides information on its four authors and accounts for the reception of the Manifesto in
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Western Academia. The third chapter, as concluding the first part of this research, offers
an  overview  of  the  twelve  sections  of  the  document.  The  second  part,  as  previously
mentioned,  is  devoted  to  exploring  the  philosophical  content  of  the  Manifesto.  In
particular, it is dedicated to the doctrine of 'Chinese Rationalism': chapter four offers an
account  of  the  fundamental  Confucian  notions  upon  which  the  doctrine  of  'Chinese
Rationalism' is theorized, while chapter five considers an important reference to Western
philosophy which is used by the authors of the Manifesto as an explanatory device in order
to clarify such doctrine. The overall analysis finally argues that the rendering of  xinxing
zhi xue as 'Rationalism' should not be dismissed as a case of poor translation, but rather, it
should be considered as the attempt of establishing a cross-cultural dialogue on the basis
of philosophical concerns (ontological, metaphysical and ethical) which are clearly shared
by both Chinese and Western traditions of thought.
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Chapter 1
Blending Tradition and Modernity:
Considerations on Conservatism in Republican China
Introduction
According  to  the  historian  Hao  Chang  “The  contemporary  New  Confucianist
thought as represented by the Manifesto of 1958 may be seen as the development of a
major trend of Chinese conservatism which had its origin in the early 1920s.”1 Such trend
evolved as a reaction to the spread of scientism started in the 19 th century and culminated
during the May Fourth period; the so-called New Confucianism, however, should not be
equated  to  Chinese  Republican  conservatism  in  general.  As  noted  by  the  present-day
scholar  Fung,  “Modern Chinese  conservatism evolved as  an intellectual  attitude rather
than an  ideology,  and  as  such  had  no  fixed,  invariable,  unchangeable  and substantive
ideals.”2 Thus, New Confucianism can be considered as a specific trend of a more general
conservative  attitude  which  characterized  the  Republican  period.  With  these
considerations in mind, the aim of this chapter is to explore the intellectual debates which
inspired and motivated the authors of the Manifesto in elaborating the document. While
providing such general framework, I also attempt to overcome the misleading dichotomy
of the notions 'modernity' and 'tradition', generally regarded as opposed and in contrast;
such opposition, in fact, is not entirely applicable to the case of Republican conservatism,
which  separated  modernisation  and  Westernisation,  and  which  creatively  conceived
Chinese tradition as charting a unique path for China's own modernisation.
1 Chang in Furth 1976: 227.
2 Fung 2008: 781.
4
The  first  section  provides  general  considerations  on  Republican  conservatism
conservatism as a reaction to the May Fourth period, and takes into account the theories of
thinkers such as Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, Wu Mi, and Liu Yizheng as exemplifying
diverse  China-based  models  of  development with  a  view to  modernity.  Such examples
developed  as  an  alternative  to  the  Eurocentric  model   sustained  by  the  May  Fourth
intellectuals, and are often identified by scholars as patterns of 'alternative modernity'.3
After  depicting  the  general  scenario  of  Republican  Chinese  conservatism,  the  second
section is devoted to the analysis of New Confucianism as a specific case of conservative
trend.  Even though I  do  not  agree  with  Bresciani  in  considering  the  Manifesto  as  the
magna carta of the New Confucian movement, considerations on New Confucianism are
nevertheless  functional  to  understand  some of  the  basic  beliefs  shared  by  its  authors,
especially with regard to Confucian tradition. The third section is an account of the debate
between scienticists (represented by Ding Wenjiang) and metaphysicians (represented by
Zhang Junmai) of 1923; such debate exemplifies the complex dialectic of modernity and
tradition prior to 1949 and clarifies the model of development elaborated in the Manifesto
of 1958.
1.1  Cultural Conservatism in Republican China
Of  the  numerous  key  events  in  Republican  China  (1911-1949),  the  May  Fourth
movement  is  of  fundamental  importance  in  the  development  of  modern  Chinese
intellectual  history.  Indeed,  the  movement  expressed  the  conviction  of  intellectuals  to
rebuild their country on the basis of a European model. As noted by Hong Kong-based
historian Hon, three major historical  events characterized the May Fourth period:  1)  a
3 Hon 2014. Even though the term 'alternative modernity' is supposed to identify a certain non-Western path of 
modernisation as “a unique approach based on one's culture and history”, the notion seems to perpetuate and 
reaffirm the Eurocentric character of modernity.
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language reform (1916-1917), which replaced Classical Chinese with the vernacular as the
standard written language  and which,  in  turn,  expanded the  production of  knowledge
beyond the classical learning; 2) several student protests in defense of China's sovereignty
against  foreign  imperialist  powers  (1919),  which  enhanced  the  identification  of  young
intellectuals with the newborn nation founded after 1911; 3) and the general criticism on
Confucian  tradition  (1915-1923),  initiated  by  the  magazine  New  Youth  ( 新 青 年 Xin
Qingnian), and which promoted the idea of a new society based on individuals rather than
local networks, family, and kinship.4 Even though the May Fourth view rapidly gained the
support of many Chinese intellectuals, some others displayed resistance to it – and this
resistance was expressed by cultural conservatives who aimed at creatively recontextualize
Chinese  tradition in  order  to  define  a  unique pattern for  China's  modernization.  With
regard to Chinese conservatism, Hon states:
In  general  terms,  modern  Chinese  conservatism  was  marked  by  a  faith  in
traditional  values that could be  revitalized and harnessed to the purposes of
modernization and by a view of society as organic in its articulation of rights and
duties and in its institutions and interrelationship of functions. It did not derive
its  category  of  thought  from  the  nation's  cultural  heritage  to  the  neglect  of
Western ideas. Nor did it reject industrialism and material progress based on
the application of science and rational technologies. Rather, it held a synthetic
view on the cultures of the East and the West, and saw national traditions as the
bases for claims to an alternative future that was progressive, raising the idea of
what contemporary scholars call 'alternative modernities', seen as progressive in
our day.  Economically,  modern Chinese conservatism recognized the modern
state  as  capitalistic  and industrialized,  but  rejected  that  as  the  only  possible
4 Hon 2014: 212.
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modernity. It believed in agrarian self-sufficiency, was wary about the effects of
foreign  manufacturers  on  the  national  economy,  and  advocated  a  mixed
economy. Politically,  conservatism in China was opposed to communism and
armed insurrection. It also had reservations about liberal democracy.5
Despite the fact that the notion of 'alternative modernity' seems to be generally used by
scholars in reference to Chinese conservatism, it  does not exhaustively account for the
synthesis  between  East  and  West  operated  by  several  conservative  intellectuals;
furthermore,  the  idea  of  'alternative  modernity'  –  misleadingly  opposing  to  a  real,  or
orthodox,  or  legitimate,  or  original  modernity  –  seems  to  perpetuate  a  Eurocentric
attitude.  Nevertheless,  this  notion  might  be  functional  in  understanding  some  China-
based  models  of  development  elaborated  by  conservative  intellectuals  during  the
Republican period. Such models were aimed at decentering Europe in discussing China's
modernisation, by separating the notions of modernisation and Westernisation.
The famous scholar-journalist Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873-1929), after visiting the
war-torn Europe in 1919, wrote a memoir where he used a detailed description of the local
massive destruction to announce the end of “the dream of the omnipotence of science” (科
学万能之梦 kexue wanneng zhimeng).6 According to Liang, the War had proven scientific
development to be a “double edged-sword”7: on the one hand, scientific discoveries had
generally improved people's life conditions; on the other hand it created lethal weapons
that  could  potentially  destroy  human  civilization.  In  addition  to  this,  Liang  also
reconsidered the Westphalian system of nation-states as unable to guarantee justice in the
context of international politics. After the decision of the Allied powers to give Shandong
German  colonies  to  Japan,  Liang  proclaimed  the  end  of  “the  sweet  dream  of  human
5 Fung 2008: 782.
6 Hon 2014: 213.
7 Hon 2014: 213.
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justice” (正义人道的好梦 zhengyi rendao de haomeng).8 In this context, Liang felt the
responsibility  for  China to make her  own contribution in  the  creation of  a  new world
culture, a feeling that was encouraged by the invitation of the British philosopher Bertrand
Russell  (1872-1970) in 1920. As reported by Fung,  “During and after his  visit,  Russell
recommended  Chinese  civilization  as  an  antidote  to  European  ills.”9 The  philosopher
Zhang Junmai (1886-1969), the most fundamental figure in conceiving and issuing the
Manifesto of  1958,  accompanied  Liang  during  his  tour  in  Europe,  and  eventually
questioned the May Fourth intellectuals' concern with science in a fundamental debate in
1923  between  the  so  called  “Scienticist  School”  and  the  “Metaphysical  School”.  Such
debate will be further discussed in the last section of this chapter.
A  similar  example  of  cultural  conservatism  is  provided  by  the  scholar  Liang
Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893-1988) who, in his book 中國民族自救運動之最後覺悟 Zhongguo
minzu zijiu yundong zhi zuihou juewu (The Final Awakening of the Chinese National Self-
salvation Movement, 1931), articulated the idea of national self-salvation (民族自救 minzu
zijiu).  Liang had accepted Western culture  in  terms of  democracy and science,  but  he
nevertheless urged Chinese people to “critically reappraise and bring forth anew China's
original attitude.”10 He stated:
The real life of a nation depends on its fundamental spirit. To throw away our
own fundamental spirit is to put an end to our own future. Our own future and
our own new life are dependent on the spirit inherent in us, which provide a
basis  for improvement.  [We] must neither look to the outside [for help] nor
retreat and degrade [ourselves]. It is only by fully developing and utilizing our
strengths and standing on our feet that we can strive [for success]. Don't depart
8 Hon 2014: 213.
9 Fung 2008: 782. For more information on Russell's considerations about China see Russell 1922.
10 Fung 2008: 790.
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from this one single step.11
As summarised  by Fung, Liang believed that the best road for China to take was rural
reconstruction, rather than the blind application of a foreign model. The Soviet system was
also  not  suitable  for  the  Chinese  case,  since  Chinese  society  was  not  class-based  and
therefore it lacked the premises for social revolution. However, similarly to many Chinese
conservatives, Liang was not entirely anti-Western. He acknowledged four main strengths
of the West: 1) its corporate organizations and attitude; 2) a certain respect for individual
autonomy;  3)  the  participation  of  members  in  corporate  life;  4)  the  'socialization  of
property'  (namely, moderate socialism). These four aspects,  Liang believed,  were to be
integrated to the five fundamental relationships of Confucian ethics.12 In some respects,
his ideas aligned with Mao Zedong's anti-consumerism and anti-urbanism, however Liang
opposed to the communists because of their violent reform program:
A peasant movement is necessary for present-day China. Anyone who ignores
the  peasant  movement  is  out  of  touch.  To  eliminate  the  Communist  Party's
peasant movement, it is necessary to launch an alternative movement. Not only
does our rural organization protect the locality against the [infiltration of the]
Communist Party, but by being the right kind of peasant movement, we can
replace the Communist Party...With our movement, we don't need others, and
we can do without the Communist Party.13
Another  debate  on  China's  path  to  modernisation  was  raised  in  1935,  which
culminated in  the  publication of  a  manifesto  signed by ten professors  – conservatives
11 Fung 2008: 790.
12 Fung 2008: 791.
13 Fung 2008: 792.
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supportive of the Nationalist government – entitled 'Declaration of Cultural Construction
on a Chinese Base'.14 The declaration stated that Chinese modernisation had to be achieved
by  blending  the  best  elements  of  Chinese  and  Western  cultures,  calling  for  a  cultural
transformation through questioning the tradition without blindly dismissing it.  Indeed,
such particular conservative attitude is aligned with that articulated in the  Manifesto of
1958.  Hu  Shi  dismissed  these  scholars'  perspective  as  reactionary,  and  regarded  their
approach as a modern version of the  ti-yong 體用 (essence-function) formula, accusing
them of hiding their conservatism “under the smoke-screen of compromise.” In addition,
he also criticized the fact that the declaration did not specify what China needed “at the
present time and in the present circumstances.”15 
Another figure of Chinese Republican conservatism who advocated the merging of
Chinese and Western cultural elements is Wu Mi 吴宓 (1894-1978). He published many
articles about Irving Babbitt's New Humanism16 as the chief editor of the journal Critical
Review (Xueheng 學衡), and translated Plato's dialogues, Dante's Inferno, and Aristotle's
Ethics, which are the major texts that inspired Babbit's theories. Hon has argued that Wu
Mi's interest in New Humanism was led by two main reasons: first, this view offered an
effective reaction to the May Fourth iconoclasm; second, New Humanism developed as a
school of thought from an industrialized country (the United States) which had already
seen both advantage and harms of modernisation. In a sense, Babbitt's theories were truly
'transcultural' for the standard of his time, and the fact that he aimed at combining the
14 Fung reports: “The declaration was published  in the Cultural Construction Monthly, the organ of the government-
sponsored Chinese Cultural Construction Council, controlled by Chen Lifu, who reportedly penned the preliminary 
draft. The ten signatories were Wang Xinming, He Bingsong, Wu Yugan, Sun Hanbing, Huang Wenshan, Tao 
Xisheng, Zhang Yi, Chen Gaoyong, Fan Zhongyun, and Sa MengWu.” (Fung 2008: 801.)
15 Fung 2008: 801. This might be noted to be an important difference with the Manifesto of 1958, which contains a 
section entitled “Our understanding of China's current political history” ( 我们对中国现代政治史之认识 Women dui 
Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi zhi renshi).
16 New Humanism spread in the United States between 1910 and 1930, as a critical movement which aimed to 
recapture the morality of past civilization in response to an age of materialism, relativism, and industrialization. Hon
reports: “While other Western thinkers stressed the benefits of scientism and materialism in producing more 
consumer goods, Babbitt focused on the role of religion and morality in shaping an individual's spiritual life.” (Hon 
2014: 213.)
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learning  of  East  and  West,  Wu Mi  held,  gave  to  China  a  potential  role  in  the  global
discourse on modernisation.  Inspired by Babbitt's  style,  Wu Mi attempted to globalize
Confucianism by linking it with Christianity and Aristotelianism, merging these traditions
through the overarching quest for moral purity. Politically, Wu Mi maintained that popular
democracy was the ideal form of government for modern China, but that the nation should
have first instructed an educated elites to lead the country; ideally, such elites would be
trained in Confucianism, Greek philosophy, Buddhism, and Christian theology. In other
words, according to Wu Mi, China's change needed to take place first in the social and
educational arena, and then in politics.
Not all conservative trends in Republican China, however, were about the encounter
of Chinese and Western cultural elements; such is the case of Liu Yizheng 柳詒徵 (1880-
1956),  a  modern  historian  who  focused  on  Chinese  history  in  order  to  develop  his
perspective on China's modernisation. In his book History of Chinese Culture (1932) Liu
focused  on  Chinese  pre-dynastic  history  (2070-221  BC)  discussing  not  so  much  the
historical events, but rather the important meaning of “great flood” (洪水 hongshui). He
identified the Yellow River great flooding during the time of the mythical Yao, Shun, and
Yu as the birth of the Chinese nation (民族 minzu). This is because, Liu observed, before
the flood China was populated by different tribes with different identities; later, the flood
crisis brought about a 'big grouping' (大群 daqun) that united the tribes in a confederation
aimed  at  organizing  human  labour,  regulating  the  transmission  of  properties  and
organizing resources. According to Liu, this tribal confederation was the foundation of the
“Chinese national character” (国民心 guomin xin). Hon reports that, in Liu's perspective:
Since  the  common  identity  of  being  Chinese  was  born  out  of  a  loose
confederation to combat river flooding, the “character of the Chinese nation”
11
had to be a double bond – a commitment to collective unity on the one hand,
and a commitment to preserving local autonomy on the other. While in time of
flooding  or  war  ,  the  commitment  to  unity  would  take  precedence  over  the
commitment to autonomy; in time of peace and prosperity, the commitment to
autonomy would take precedence over the commitment to unity.17
For this reason Liu thought of China (中国 Zhongguo) as meaning “finding the middle
ground between opposing positions.”18
In  this  section  I  have  briefly  discussed  different  models  of  Chinese  Republican
conservatism in order to highlight two main points; first, Chinese conservatism during the
Republican period does not equate anti-Westernization, and should rather be considered
as an attempt of  bringing together elements of  both European modernity and Chinese
tradition; second, Chinese conservatism evolved as an articulated intellectual attitude, and
as  such  did  not  have  fixed  and  substantive  ideals.  Some  intellectuals  argued  for  the
blending of Western and Chinese elements, while others considered Chinese culture and
history as the most fundamental source for a national reconstruction. In this context, New
Confucianism has to be considered as a specific stream of Chinese conservatism rather
than its main and only proponent.
1.2  The Case of New Confucianism
Mou Zongsan 牟宗三(1909-1995) during the 1970s has proposed the idea that the
development of Confucian tradition can be divided in three waves: pre-Qin Confucianism
(classical  Confucianism),  Song-Ming  Confucianism  (Neo-Confucianism),  and
contemporary Confucianism – generally called 'New Confucianism'. The philosopher Liu
17 Hon 2014: 220-221.
18 Hon 2014: 221.
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Shu-hsien has argued that “When we study these three waves we find that Confucianism
should not be regarded simply as an armchair philosophy: they became trend of vitality in
response to  the  needs  of  their  times.”19 For  this  reason,  New Confucianism should be
regarded as both the latest development of Confucian tradition and a specific conservative
trend emerged during the Republican period20. It is important to note, however, that the
term 'New Confucianism' (新儒家 xin Rujia) seems to be a retrospective creation, as it
started to indicate a specific movement only during the 1970s.21 During the Republican
period, advocates of Confucianism could not be recognized as a specific movement, since
they did not propound official basic tenets (as, for example, in the case of the May Fourth
movement).  Despite  the  difficulty  in  clearly  grouping  the  New  Confucians  of  the
Republican period, it  is  still  possible to identify  certain characteristics shared by those
scholars who valued Confucianism as a vital cultural source for modern times. According
to  Hao  Chang  “The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  New  Confucianist  intellectuals  as
compared with the other varieties of cultural conservatism in twentieth-century China was
their  self  image  of  being  the  modern  defenders  of  the  Neo-Confucian  ethicospiritual
symbolism which they prized as the core of Confucian faith.”22 This is true, in the sense
that many New Confucians elaborated their philosophical views on the basis of the Lu-
Wang school. However, Chang observation does not justify the syncretism of Confucian
tradition and Western philosophy as found, for example, in the Manifesto of 1958. 
Liu Shu-hsien has compiled an insightful list of the common features of modern
advocates  of  Confucianism.  Since  such  common  features  are  well  identifiable  in  the
Manifesto,  it  is  functional  to  report  some  of  Liu's  points  in  order  to  gain  a  general
19 Liu 1991: 378.
20 “Confucianism was honored as the orthodoxy since the Han dynasty, but it gradually lost its appeal to the 
intellectuals who were greatly attracted by Buddhism and Neo-Taoism: consequently, creative talents flocked to the 
camp of Buddhism, turning Tang dynasty into the golden age of Chinese Buddhism. Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism 
answered the challenges from Buddhism and Neo-Taoism by absorbing insights from these trends and developing 
sophisticated new cosmologies and philosophical anthropologies based on the spirit of Confucianism which they 
inherited from the past.” (Liu 1991: 378.)
21  Makeham 2015.
22 Hao 1976: 278.
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understanding of the intellectual trend which associated the authors of the document:
• Metaphysically, they believe that there is a creative ontological principle
which works incessantly  in  the  universe;  without  its  work  there  would  be
nothing in the world.
• Epistemologically, this metaphysical principle can be known through the
realization of the depth of reason inherent in every human being, but it cannot
be reached through either logical inference or empirical generalization.
• Axiologically there is intrinsic meaning and value in the existent beings
in the world. If  there where not a common source of all values, then it would
inevitably follow that our values are arbitrary and relative.
• Cosmologically, the function of the creative ontological principle finds its
manifestation in the formative process of the natural world, and man is a unique
product of the evolutionary process of nature.
• Ethically, because man is endowed with the depth of reason so that he is
by  nature  a  moral  being,  this  answers  the  question:  “Why  should  man  be
moral?” Man must try his best  to mould himself  to  be a moral  and creative
being.
• Socially, as man cannot isolate himself from fellow human beings, the
commitment to the basic family  and social structures are to be preserved, even
jealously  guarded.  Man  is  not  only  an  intimate  part  of  nature,  but  also  an
intimate part of society.
• Politically, traditional ideal to take politics as an extension of ethics must
be revised […] Hence contemporary New Confucian scholars are convinced that
the Western practice of democracy through elections is preferable to traditional
14
practices.
• Educationally, without any doubt knowledge of science and technology
must be emphasized in school curriculum, but these subjects do not exhaust the
whole  range  of  education.  Humanistic  and  moral  education  should  also  be
emphasized. How to achieve a balance of the two is one of the most important
concerns of modern educators.23
These characteristics  can be regarded as beliefs which are generally  shared by modern
advocates of Confucianism. It is interesting that Liu appeals to the concept of 'reason', a
term which is typical of Western philosophical tradition rather than Confucianism. The
notion of reason in Confucian thought, with particular reference to the Manifesto of 1958,
will be analyzed in chapters four and five. I shall now turn to a fundamental intellectual
debate of the Republican period, as the most representative of the opposition between May
Fourth iconoclasm and cultural conservatism.
1.3  The Debate on Science and Metaphysics
China's modernization between the late 19th and early 20th century, as noted above,
is often regarded as characterized by a tension between conservatism and modernism. In
the  first  section,  I  have  reported  different  examples  of  conservative  intellectuals  who
reacted to the May Fourth movement by theorizing China-based models of development.
Apart  from  those  models,  an  even  more  fundamental  debate  which  exemplifies  the
intellectual tensions of the Republican period took place in the early 1920s. This was a
debate between two schools of thought, the so-called “Scienticist School”, represented by
23 Liu 1991: 384.
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Ding Wenjiang, and the “Metaphysical School”, represented by Zhang Junmai. The direct
cause of the debate was a lecture given by Zhang Junmai in 1923 at Tsing-hua University
about the 'outlook on life' (人生观 rensheng guan).24 Even though Ding and Zhang were
the main figures of the debate, many other intellectuals took part in it (for example Liang
Qichao and Hu Shi); the exchange between the two scholars lasted for the entire year, after
which a collection of thirty-one essays was published in order to present the views of both
sides.25
In his lecture, Zhang distinguished science from the outlook on life. He pointed out
that, while science is objective and governed by logic, the outlook on life is subjective and
guided by intuition; while science is analytic and dominated by causation, the outlook on
life is synthetic and  based on free will. Zhang was not against scientific development, he
thought that it was a necessary requirement for China's future development (he points this
out in the  Manifesto too); however, he thought that science has its own limitations, and
that  it  should  be  distinguished  from  the  outlook  on  life.  On  the  other  hand,  Ding
emphasized  the  universal  validity  of  science  as  having  an  unlimited  scope:  “The
omnipotence  of  science”  he  stated,  “lies  not  in  its  subject  matter,  but  in  its  method.
Einstein's  theory of  relativity  is  science,  James's  psychology  is  science,  Liang Qichao's
historical  methodology  is  science,  and  so  is  Hu  Shi's  study  of  the  Dream  of  the  Red
Chamber.”26 This is why, according to the supporters of scientism, “Science can solve all
the  problems  of  the  outlook  on  life.”27 Unlike  Western  metaphysical  tradition,  the
supporters of the Metaphysical school did not try to transform metaphysics into science,
but scienticists argued that philosophy,  like the natural world and human existence, was
ultimately  dominated  by  scientific  principles.  Ding,  replying  to  Zhang's  distinction
between science and the outlook on life, stated:
24 Yang 2002: 80.
25 Hon 2014: 215.
26 Chou 1978: 569.
27 Yang 2002: 82.
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Metaphysics is really a worthless devil  – having scraped along in Europe for
something over two thousand years, until he is now coming to find himself with
no place to turn and nothing to eat, suddenly he puts up a false  trade mark,
hangs  out  a  new  signboard,  and  comes  swaggering  along  to  China  to  start
working his swindle. If  you don't  believe it,  please just take a look at Zhang
Junmai's “outlook on life”.28
Ding's  notion  of  science  as  universal  mode  of  thinking,  led  him  to  defend  European
civilization “with great intensity and naivete”.29 According to him, science should also play
a fundamental  role  in  politics,  requiring that  only  those with  exhaustive  knowledge of
'science'  be  qualified  to  enter  the  government:  “even  if  European  civilization  were
bankrupt (which is not the case), science is absolutely not responsible for it.”30 In order to
combat scientism, Zhang proposed a philosophical syncretism which was reflective of his
academic training in Confucianism and European Idealism; he aimed to blend the original
Confucian spirit with the philosophies of Bergson, Kant, and Eucken, in order to establish
metaphysics as the most embracing and synthetic knowledge. This, of course, was not a
project to re-establish metaphysics per se, but rather to create a new cultural pattern for
China's development: “Culture grows out of the inner spirit of a people. It is individualistic
and  independent  […]  The  direction  of  China's  new  culture  must  be  determined  by
ourselves  and by our  own spiritual  demands.”31 In  particular,  Zhang defended the Lu-
Wang  notion  of  'mind'  ( 心 xin),  as  he  understood  that  particular  stream  of  Neo-
Confucianism as aligned to the European idealistic tradition. Ding, on his side, regarded
the Lu-Wang school as meaningless and detached from reality; he even attributed to it the
28 Chou 1978: 569.
29 Chou 1978: 570.
30 Chou 1978: 570.
31 Chou 1978: 568.
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negative historical happenings of the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties: “After all, what is
the value of such a 'spiritual'  civilization?”32 On his part,  Zhang defended his idea of a
“philosophy of life [as] a complete totality which cannot be partitioned and analyzed.”33 
At the end of 1923, the supporters of scientism won in great majority, and Hu Shi
(the arbiter of the debate) proposed a “scientific philosophy of life” in the extensive preface
to the anthology of the debate literature.34 However, the discussion on Zhang Junmai's
philosophy  of  life  significantly  shaped  the  later  development  of  New  Confucianism;
Zhang's theory marked the initial stage in the formulation of a metaphysics centered on
the notion of 'reason' and 'human nature', which creatively merged the Confucian spirit
and elements of Western philosophical tradition. Such metaphysical system is precisely the
core philosophical theory articulated in the Manifesto of 1958.
Conclusion
New  Confucianism  should  be  understood  as  the  development  of  one  specific
intellectual trend among various and diversified streams of Chinese conservatism during
the Republican period. It is  precisely in this context that the historical and intellectual
foundations of the Manifesto are to be found, with particular regard to the rejection of
absolute  scientism  and  the  will  to  merge  Chinese  and  Western  cultural  and  political
elements.  In  addition  to  these  considerations,  the  debate  between  Science  and
Metaphysics of 1923 is also of great importance in understanding the document,  since it
provides  important  insights  into  the  initial  stage  of  the  philosophical  framework
developed in the Manifesto itself.
32 Chou 1978: 570.
33 Chou 1978: 566.
34 Chou 1978: 572.
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Chapter 2
A Brief History of the Manifesto: Authors, Conception , and Reception
Introduction
The American scholar Nathan Sivin has stated that “it is hard to think of any idea
responsible for more fuziness in writing about China than the notion of Confucianism.”35
The  main  reason  for  this  is  that  the  term  “Confucianism”  has  been  applied  to  many
different things (a tradition of scholarship, a social ethic, a religion, and a state ideology).36
Contemporary  historisn  Jensen  has  even  argued  that  Confucianism  has  become  a
synonym  of  “'real'  Chineseness”  in  the  West  (Europe  and  North  America)  from  the
sixteenth century onward.37 Overall,  it  is  undeniable that  Confucianism is  a  broad and
exceedingly articulated tradition which cannot be reduced to any brief definition. Bresciani
has summarized the cultural heritage of New Confucian scholars as follows: 
There is the heritage of Confucius and of other ancient Confucians, with their
ethical  concerns,  but  also  with  their  wide  interest  in  cosmology  (Book  of
Changes), in political theory and also ontological and even theological insights
partly inherited from the classics and partly borrowed from Daoism (Zhuangzi,
Daodejing) and from Mozi. There is the rich heritage  of Han dynasty and the
influence  of  Buddhist  thought,  and  finally  the  complex  work  of  synthesis,
comprised under the name of Neo-Confucianism.”38 
35 Sivin 1984: xiii.
36  Makeham 2003: 1.
37 Jensen 1997: 79.
38 Bresciani 2001: 37.
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With regard to 20th century New Confucianism, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Tang Junyi 唐君毅,
Xu Fuguan 徐復觀  are generally considered to be the leaders of the second generation of
New Confucians (dated from 1950 to 1979), while Zhang Junmai 张君劢 is considered to be
part of the first generation (from 1921 to 1949).39 These four scholars, who jointly signed
the Manifesto, shared the above mentioned Confucian heritage and, in particular, a great
admiration for the Ming philosopher Wang Yangming 王阳明(1472–1529), but they were
also  informed  by  Western  philosophers  such  as  Spinoza  and  Kant.  Despite  these
underlying intellectual commonalities, however, the four scholars had different approaches
in considering  and articulating the cross-cultural significance of Confucianism. Having
this considered, in order to better contextualize and grasp the context of the Manifesto, the
first section of this chapter takes into account the intellectual formation of the authors of
the  document.  The second section is  devoted to the  issuing of  the  Manifesto,  from its
conception which started with Zhang Junmai in 1957 (while he was living in exile in the
United  states)  to  the  publication  of  its  English  translation  in  1962.  In  the  concluding
section I take into account the few existing interpretations of the document in order to
provide a general picture of the status of the Manifesto in contemporary scholarship.
2.1  The Authors
The four scholars that co-signed the Manifesto, as mentioned earlier, are considered
to be the leaders of both first and second generations of New Confucians; their intellectual
formation  and  shared  beliefs  with  regard  to  Confucian  tradition  not  only  shaped  the
39 The three generations division of New Confucians was originally suggested by Tu Weiming 杜维明, and adopted by
Fang Keli 方克立 . According to such division, the first generation counted Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893-1988), 
Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883-1967), Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968), Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895-1990), He Lin  賀麟 
(1902-1992), Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895-1990), and Zhang Junmai  张君劢 (1886-1969).
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content  of  the  document,  but  also  influenced  the  later  developments  of  contemporary
Confucianism. With particular reference to the Manifesto, it is useful to the aim of this
research to acquaint ourselves with the intellectual background of these scholars, in order
to understand what brought them to jointly publish the document at issue.
Zhang Junmai 张君劢  (1887-1969), also known in the West as Carsun Chang, was
born in Jiading, Jiangsu Province, into a family of salt merchants. In 1902 he entered the
newly founded Aurora Academy in Shanghai, a Catholic institution whose purpose was to
train qualified translators of Western scientific works. In 1906 Zhang moved to Japan and
enrolled  in  the  preparatory  courses  for  economics  and  political  science  at  Waseda
University, Tokyo. However the scholarship he obtained was meant for studies in physics
and chemistry, so when it was found out that he studies economics and political science
instead, his funding was suspended. The period spent in Japan was extremely important
for  Zhang's  intellectual  formation:  in  order  to  economically  support  himself  and  his
brother, he started writing articles for the New Citizen Miscellaneous Magazine (Xinmin
Congbao 新民叢報) edited by Liang Qichao, with whom, as reported by Bresciani, he had a
“teacher-disciple relationship, and from whom he acquired a constitutionalist, rather than
revolutionary, approach to Chinese politics.”40 When he was finally able to continue his
studies at Waseda University, he read the classics of Western political thought, forming his
lifelong devotion to constitutional democracy,  with particular preference for the Anglo-
American system.41 After the end of the First World War, Zhang traveled around Europe
with Liang Qichao for more than one year and observed the development of socialism in
different  European  countries.42 Beside  contributing  to  Zhang's  political  formation,  this
40 Bresciani 2001: 145.
41 Bresciani 2001: 145.
42 Bresciani notes “There was plenty to work on: the Congress of Versailles, the Russian Revolution, the new 
Republican Constitution of  Weimar Germany, the political movements in France, the activities of the various parties
in Great Britain, and so forth.” (Bresciani 2001: 147.)
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travel  was also fundamental in terms of philosophical  interest:  in 1921, Zhang met the
German philosopher Rudolf  Eucken (1846-1926),  in Jena.  He got so fascinated by this
meeting that eventually decided to temporarily leave politics aside in order to focus on the
study  of  philosophy,  under  Eucken's  patronage.  In  192343 Zhang  founded a  college  in
Shanghai, later called National Political University, with the specific aim of forming a new
political elite to shape the future Chinese political scene. Four years later, however, the
college was occupied by the Guomindang and used as headquarters;  as a consequence,
Zhang had to abandon the project. Later, in April 1933, the National Socialist Party held its
first congress, during which Zhang was elected secretary-general. His most fundamental
political contribution, however, was in 1946 when, while he was traveling between England
and United States, Zhang was recalled back to China for an inter-party congress with the
aim of drafting a constitution for the Republic; the constitution got approved on December
25 by the Nanjing parliament, but was never applied because of the following civil war.
After 1949, Zhang taught in India until 1952, year in which he permanently settled in the
United States and taught at the University of California at Berkeley until his death in 1969.
Zhang's philosophical view was best explicated in his lecture at Qinghua University,
where he compared science and metaphysics as having opposite characteristics.44 During
his  studies  with  Eucken,  Zhang  elaborated  the  idea  that  behind  national  and  social
conflicts there were philosophical issues, and he developed a combination of Hegelian and
Kantian  metaphysics  combined to  Neo-Confucian thought,  with  particular  reference to
Wang  Yangming.  Zhang  defined  his  own  philosophical  position  as  “realistic  idealism”
(weishi de weixin zhuyi 唯实的唯心主义)45; in his ontology, Zhang conceived substance and
manifestation as coexisting and mutually necessary, while in epistemology he maintained
43 After Zhang sparked the debate between Science and Metaphysics on February 14, with his lecture at Qinghua 
University on A view of Life, discussed in chapter 1.
44 See chapter 1.
45 Bresciani 2001: 158.
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that the object and the knowing subject are separate entities, equally existing. Similarly to
Kant,  Zhang  believed  that  ontological  issues,  such  as  the  Ultimate  Cause  (or  Original
Substance), cannot be exhaustively explained by human knowledge, nevertheless they have
a fundamental moral value as reminders of prudence and self-restrain:
Kant designated this kind of issues to the sphere of morality. By doing so, on the
one hand he preserved the accuracy of scientific knowledge: on the other hand,
he respectfully attributed to human behavior the heavenly rule that one should
'be self-restrained and prudent regarding what he/she does not see, be fearful
about what he/she does not hear.' Truly, Kant exerted himself and was profound
and far-reaching in his thought.46
With regard to his ethical thought, Zhang maintained that intellectual human activity –
knowledge – was to be lead by morality (“In order that science may be in the service of
humankind,  knowledge  must  conform to  the  standard  of  morality.”47),  a  belief  that  is
widely  shared  among  New  Confucian  thinkers.  In  opposition  to  materialism  and
naturalism, two intellectual trends that were spreading in early twentieth century China,
Zhang  believed  that  moral  values  provide  unchanging  categories  of  interpretation  for
humankind, even though he recognized that such categories cannot be conceived apart
from social changes:
Regarding human morality, I believe that in the midst of daily changes, there
are  things  unchanging;  among  unchanging  things  there  are  daily  changing
things. Human life can never set itself aside from this material world. Human
46 Bresciani 2001: 158.
47 Bresciani 2001: 160.
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history has seen primitive life,  feudal society, and eras of autocratic regimes.
The so-called standards of ethics or behavior can never subsist apart from social
transformations. However, the march toward the goal of truth and goodness, in
every age as well as in the present, has always been the same.48
Among  Zhang's  works,  it  is  worth  mentioning  The  Development  of  Neo-Confucian
Thought (1957-1962): the book provides a comprehensive study on the development of
Neo-Confucianism from Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824) until the end of the Ming dynasty  (1644).
The  fundamental  importance  of  this  work  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  contributed  to  what
Bresciani calls “the internationalization of Confucianism”.49 Before this publication, in fact,
the only comprehensive source on the history and philosophy of Neo-Confucian thinkers
was D. Bodde's translation of Feng Youlan's History of Chinese Philosophy (1952).
 Tang Junyi 唐君毅  (1909-1978) was born in Yibin District, Sichuan province. His
father was a scholar formed as a disciple of the Buddhist master Ouyang Jingwu, who
taught mainly Confucian tradition. At the age of 17, Tang moved to Beijing to continue his
studies  at  Beijing  University,  where  he  was  influenced  by  Liang  Shuming.  In  1927,
however, he moved to Nanjing Central University where, in the same year, he enrolled in a
course  offered  by  Xiong  Shili  (one  of  the  leaders  of  the  first  generation  of  New
Confucians), and eventually became his disciple. In 1932 Tang graduated in Philosophy,
and started his teaching career as assistant professor in Nanjing, teaching in the following
years also at Huaxi University and Jinlin University. Because of the chaos brought by the
civil  war  in  1949,  Tang  moved to  Hong Kong,  where  he  founded the journal  Minzhu
48 Bresciani 2001: 159.
49 Bresciani 2001: 155.
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pinglun 民主評論  (Democratic Tribune) together with Xu Fuguan. The following year, he
founded  the  New  Asia  College  in  partnership  with  Qian  Mu  and  other  scholars  who,
according to Bresciani, “where bound together by the love for Chinese culture and freedom
of research.”50 Beside the great variety of scholars' activity, it is worth remembering Tang's
Seminar on Chinese Culture, which was held weekly at the New Asia Research Institute.
Later, in the 1960s, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan were teaching there as well, and the
college later became one of the three colleges of the Chinese University of Hong Kong,
established in 1963. However, in 1977, since Tang was at odds with the policies of the
University,  he  removed  the  affiliated  Research  Center  and  reestablished  it  as  an
independent institution, which he lead until his death in 1978.
Similarly to other Confucian thinkers of his age, Tang was influenced by German
Idealism and, in particular, by Kant and Hegel. The main synthesis of his philosophical
thought is presented in his last book The Existence of Life and the World of the Spirit,51
where he gathered and unified all  the ideas  he developed during his  life.   Here,  Tang
articulates his theory of the Nine Spheres52, by means of which he explores the activity of
the human spirit,  that is,  “everything that makes up the object  and content of human
knowledge.”53 Tang considered the pursue of knowledge as independent of, and different
from,  moral  practice;  however,  as  reported  by  Tu  Li,  “the  pursuit  of  specific  kinds  of
knowledge , such as empirical science, formal science, applied science, and history, must
not be contrary to moral reason.”54 Tang thought about the moral life as the application of
moral reasoning, or the moral self, to daily life. This moral self is a character common to
all humans, but is becomes transcendent – not limited by physical conditions – when we
actually live in accordance with this moral source. According to Tang, the latter is the true
50 Bresciani 2001: 302.
51 Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie  生命存在与心灵境界,1977.
52 For a brief but comprehensive description of Tang's Nine Spheres theory see Bresciani 2001: 312-325.
53 Bresciani 2001: 313.
54 Cua 2013: 714.
25
source of human freedom, and can help us understanding how the moral self involves self-
arrangement  and  self-discipline.  Specifically,  Tang  referred  to  the  moral  self  as  a
“metaphysical self”,  as well  as  benxing 本性 (original human nature) and  benxin  本心
(original human mind).55 
Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903-1982) was born in Xishui District, Hubei Province, as the
soon of a village schoolteacher. He was taught by his father until the age of twelve, when
he  moved to  the  local  elementary  school.  By  the  time  he  was  twenty,  Xu  passed  the
entrance college-level examination for the Hubai Guoxueyuan. In 1930 he moved to Japan
and continued his studies at Meiji University, and eagerly read the Japanese translations
of  Western  works  on  economics  and  politics.56 Because  of  financial  necessity  he  later
entered the  Officers  Academy of  the  Japanese  Army.  The latter,  in  the  following  year
(1931)  occupied  the  northeast  of  China  and  established  the  Manchukuo;  in  the  same
period, Xu was jailed because of his anti-Japanese feelings, and got eventually expelled
from the Army. In 1932 he returned to China and enrolled in the military, starting his
career  in  the  Chinese  Army,  until  he  attained  the  rank  of  general  in  1945,  while  the
following year he moved to Nanjing and became editor of the journal Source of Learning
Monthly (Xue yuan yuekan 學原月刊). In 1949 Xu was invited by Jiang Jieshi (also known
as Chiang Kai-shek) in Xikou,  in order to write and present a reform program for the
Guomindang.  In  June  of  the  same  year  he  then  moved  to  Hong  Kong  and  founded,
together with Tang Junyi, the journal Democratic Critique in order to “fight Communism
by means of cultural media.”57 As reported by Mou Zongsan:
55 Cua 2013: 713.
56 Bresciani 2001: 331.
57 Bresciani 2001: 332.
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The years of 1951-1961 were the years of  Democratic Tribune.  Many writings
concerning  Chinese  culture  by  Tang  Junyi  and  by  myself  first  appeared  in
Democratic Tribune. At that time the New Asia College (in Hong Kong) was in
serious financial difficulties, and its development owes a lot to the concrete help
from Democratic Tribune. Xu Fuguan was exerting his strongest support.58
After this decade, he left active political life and moved to Taiwan, where he was appointed
professor in the Department of Literature at  Donghai  University,  in Taizhong.  Xu was
well-known  for  his  criticism:  he  was  particularly  skeptical  towards  the  Westernising
intellectual trend prevailing in Taiwan during the 1960s, mainly fostered by Hu Shi, who
was the Dean of Academia Sinica at that time. Precisely because of his harsh criticism, Xu
was eventually fired and moved to Hong Kong to join the teaching staff  of the New Asia
College, where he stayed until his death in 1982.
According  to  Bresciani,  “Xu  Fuguan  was  committed  to  explaining  the  cultural
heritage of the Chinese to the people of his age.”59 In doing so, he focused on the concern
for practical social needs at the basis of Confucian thought which, Xu maintained, was
inseparable from Chinese cultural identity. Therefore, in the debate between science and
metaphysics,  Xu  engaged  in  the  development  of  an  ontology  that  could  serve  for  the
reconstruction of Confucian thought in his age. Even though he started as a disciple of
Xiong Shili,  Xu later became very skeptical  towards his  approach,  which attempted to
rebuild Confucianism through the development of a metaphysics. This, according to Xu,
was against the original practical concerns of Confucius:
58 Bresciani 2001: 333.
59 Bresciani 2001: 337.
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One should start from concrete life,  from ethical behavior, then step-by-step
rise up to the metaphysical level of the Heavenly Destiny (tianming 天命) and
the Way of Heaven (tiandao 天道). By not following this route, one's system is
not on steady ground. Metaphysical doctrines, one system following another,
they are very much like a revolving lantern throughout the history of thought;
they have never become firm.60
Xu shared with New Confucian thinkers a great concern for ethics. He noticed, however,
that Chinese ethics was very different from Western ethics: while since Socrates onward
every  ethical  system  was  deductively  construct  as  the  consequence  of  a  metaphysical
system, Confucianism emphasized the concrete improvement of human society by means
of  practical  teaching concerning 'earthly'  matters.  Following Confucius,  Xu maintained
that the greatest ethical discovery was made by Mencius with his theory of human innate
goodness:
The doctrine of the goodness of human nature of Mencius has been a great
discovery. After this discovery, each human being's personality is a cosmos, is a
universe, is eternal. Through the nature of a human being, one can read the
destiny of humankind, control the destiny of humankind, and solve the destiny
of humankind.61
Because  of  his  ethical  concern,  Xu  Fuguan  is  described  as  “a  champion  of  ethical
humanism, to mean a humanism grounded on the moral self.”62
60 Bresciani 2001: 340.
61 Bresciani 2001: 343.
62 Bresciani 2001: 353.
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Mou Zongsan 牟宗三  (1909-1995) was born in Qixia,  Shandong Province,  in a
peasant family with few means of subsistence. After two years of preparatory courses, he
enrolled in Beijing University to study Philosophy; he got absorbed in studying Russell and
Whitehead's  Principia  Mathematica and  Whitehead's  Process  and  Reality.  He  also
engaged  with  a  grand  scale  study  of  the  Book  of  Changes (Yijing 易 經 ),  from  the
cosmological thought of Han commentators to later Qing scholars. Mou, similarly to the
New Confucian thinkers of his age, considered his research as a way to strengthen the
Chinese nation; influenced by Hegel, he viewed Chinese history and culture as a coherent
whole with a knowable development.  With regard to the history of Confucian thought,
Mou elaborated his 'three lineages' theory (sanxi 三係); beside the two schools of thought
generally identified with Neo-Confucianism, namely, the School of Principle (lixue 理學),
represented by Zhu Xi (1130-1200), and the School of Mind (xinxue 心學), represented by
Wang  Yangming  (1472-1529),  Mou  also  identified  a  third  Neo-Confucian  school  of
thought. The latter, according to him, was best represented by the thought of Hu Wufeng
(1105-1161) and Liu Jishan (1578-1645), and was to be considered the true exemplification
of Confucian orthodoxy.63 Nevertheless, Mou wanted to reconstruct Chinese Philosophy as
a  whole,  not  solely  its  Confucian tradition,  and  therefor  wrote  extensively  on Chinese
Buddhism and partly on Daoism, taking into account their interactions with Confucianism.
Mou  is  mostly  well-known  for  his  moral  metaphysics,  which  he  developed
throughout his life under the influence of Xiong Shili. According to Mou, the usual path of
Western philosophy consisted in constructing metaphysics from epistemology and logic ,
consequently arriving at ethical principles by means of ontology. Confucian thought, on
the other hand, followed a different path, according to which ethics was the starting point
63 Bresciani 2001: 361.
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in the construction of a metaphysics. For this reason, Mou considered the development of
Confucianism as the development of moral metaphysics.64 He largely appropriated Kant's
philosophy, though often attaching a different connotation or meaning to terms used by
the German philosopher: the expression 'moral metaphysics' (daode de xingshangxue 道德
的形上學), for example, is the inversion of Kant's  Metaphysics of Morals. A fundamental
notion in Mou's philosophy is that of 'intellectual intuition (zhi de zhijue  知的直覺 ), a
source of 'direct' knowledge of reality which is not subjected to space, time, and cause-effet
relations. Mou maintained that Kant was wrong in attributing intellectual intuition to God
alone,  and  that  the  biggest  contribution  given  by  Confucianism  was  precisely  the
affirmation  that  human  beings  posses  this  same  source  of  knowledge.  By  means  of
intellectual intuition, he maintained, the mind gets knowledge of the things-in-themselves;
however,  the  mind is  also subjected to  the  formation of  interpretative categories,  in  a
process named by Mou as 'self-negation'. This process leads the mind to its lower level, in
which it employs sensory knowledge and conventional categories such as time and space.
These  two  levels  of  the  mind  (intellectual  intuition  and  sensory  knowledge)  are  the
fundamental components of Mou's two-level ontology.
The  four  authors  of  the  Manifesto,  as  mentioned  earlier,  are  considered  as
representatives of the first and second generation of New Confucians. It is undeniable,
considering  what  reported  above,  that  all  of  them  shared  a  concern  for  the  status  of
Confucianism in their times. Such shared preoccupation, however, also involved several
nuances of disagreement among the four thinkers. We have seen how, philosophically,
they were inspired by German idealism. With regard to Confucian philosophical heritage,
on the other hand, they were divided about what was to be emphasized between Classical
64 Bresciani 2001: 378.
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Confucianism  and  Neo-Confucianism.  In  addition  to  this,  the  authors  also  developed
different positions with regard to ontology and metaphysics. All the differences inherited
by  their  intellectual  formation  and  believes  became  evident  during  the  drafting  of
Manifesto.  Despite  their  disagreement  on  different  philosophical  and  political  issues,
however, they clearly showed an underlying concern for Confucian ethics, which was to be
later articulated in the text of the Manifesto.
2.2  Conception and publication of the Manifesto
As previously mentioned, the Manifesto was first published on January 1st, 1958 in
the Taiwan journal National Renaissance (再生  Zaisheng), founded by Zhang Junmai in
1932.  It  was  later  published  (May  1st)  also  in  the  Hong  Kong  magazine   Democratic
Critique (民主評論 Minzhu pinglun), founded by Xu Fuguan and Tang Junyi in 1949. The
full title of the document is: “A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture: Our Joint
Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook”65 (为中国文化
敬告世界人士宣言–我们对中国学术研究及中国文化与世界文化前途之共同认识).66 The preface of
the first Chinese edition reports a note from the editor (Tang Junyi), which is also reported
in the  English translation,  and that  briefly  explains  the story of  the  conception of  the
Manifesto67: the project started after a conversation between Zhang and Tang, who met in
the United States  in  1957.  They both expressed their  concerns for  the Western biased
perspective on Chinese culture and politcs, and therefore decided to write an article to
65 Makeham 2003: 1.
66 The English title dispenses the expression 敬告世界人士宣言 jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan, 'respectfully announced 
to the people of the world'.
67 “The motive in writing this Manifesto originated with Dr. Carson Chang when, in a talk with Prof. Tang Chun-i in 
the spring of 1957, he showed much concern over the many short-comings with which some Westerners approach 
the study of Chinese academic works, while their basic understanding of Chinese culture and political outlook was 
also variously inadequate. Thereupon, Dr. Chang wrote both Prof. Mou Tsung-san and Prof. Hsu Fu-kwan, asking 
for their consent to jointly publish an article to express their corrective views.” (M(e) 1962: 1)
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report their corrective views. Tang already prepared a draft on the same year, and sent it to
Zhang, Xu and Mou for their revision. Zhang and Mou agreed on Tang's draft, while Xu
Fuguan, on the other hand, expressed some discrepancies. First, according to Xu the draft
did  not  emphasize  enough the fact  that  democratic  principles  are  intrinsic  to  Chinese
culture. Second, he stated that Tang's draft was overly focused on the religious aspect of
Chinese culture which, according to Xu, was in reality detached from religion as from the
Spring and Autumn Period (771-476 bc). Tang agreed in rectifying the first objection, but
he did not integrate Xu's second observation.68 
Interestingly,  even  though  the  main  target  of  the  document  were  Western
intellectuals, after a long drafting process the Manifesto was first published in Chinese:
The purpose of this article is primarily to benefit Western intellectuals in aiding
them to  appreciate Chinese culture.  It took considerable time for translation
from Chinese into English. This, together with conviction that any attempt to
modify Westerner' prejudices toward our culture should be based first on our
true  evaluation  and  self-examination,  prompted  us  to  publish  it  earlier  in
Chinese in the Democratic Critique and National Renaissance.69
Such 'self-examination' delayed the publication of the first unabridged English translation
of the document, which has no given date of publication. However, scholar in Intercultural
Studies Solé-Farràs was able to deduce it thanks to an opuscule entitled A Symposium on
Chinese Culture, published in 1964 in Taiwan. He reports that,according to a note from the
publisher  of  the  same  opuscule,  Cheng  Qibao,  “this  symposium  was  prepared  for
68 Solé-Farràs 2014: 159.
69 Solé-Farràs 2014: 159.
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discussion at the joint session of the Tenth Round Table Conference on Chinese American
Cultural  Relations  and  the  Sixth  Annual  Conference  of  the  America  Association  of
Teachers  of  Chinese  Language  and  Culture  which  took  place  on  8  May  1964,  at  the
University of Maryland.”70 The document contains a brief summary of the English edition
of the Manifesto, accompanied by an opening note saying:
Two years ago, a gropu of well-known Chinese scholars led by Dr. Carson Chang
and  Prof.  Tang  Chun-yi,  issued  a  Manifesto  on  the  Reappraisal  of  Chinese
Culture,  which has since  attracted wide attention among [Chinese] academic
circles. It is a joint statement attempting to clarify what is the true nature of
Chinese culture and its place in the new world order.71 
Considering that the title and subtitle of the summary provided in the Appendix of the
opuscule coincide with the English version published in the Taiwanese journal  Chinese
Culture, we can deduce that the latter was published in 1962 (“two years ago”). Beside this
version,  the  most  well-known  translation  of  the  Manifesto  is  the  abridged  version
(counting  nine  sections  instead  of  twelve)  that  Zhang  Junmai  included  in  the  second
volume of his The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought (1962) as appendix, under the
title A Manifesto for a Reappraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture.
70 Solé-Farràs 2014: 164.
71 Solé-Farràs 2014, 164.
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2.3 Reception of the Manifesto
The quote from the opuscule mentioned above states that, since its first publication
in Chinese, the Manifesto attracted wide attention among Chinese academic circles. This,
however, does not seem to be the case with regard to Western academia. Few scholars
(such as  Bresciani  and Makeham) researched the topic,  but  only as  part  of   a  general
discourse on New Confucianism. In short, no scholars have comprehensively considered
the  Manifesto  as  an  independent  historical  and  philosophical  document.  It  is  useful,
however, to take into account the previous studies on the subject, in order to understand
contemporary  scholarly  interpretations  of  the  Manifesto,  and  therefore  consider  the
motives  of  the  current  research.  With  regard  to  the  publications  that  more  or  less
extensively  deal  with  the  document  as  part  of  a  more  general  discourse  on  New
Confucians, it  is  possible to identify to main categories of interpretation; the first,  best
expressed by Bresciani in his Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement
(2001), considers the document to be the magna carta of New Confucianism, articulating
the  basic  tenets  of   the  intellectual  movement;  the  second,  relatable  to  Makeham's
perspective,  generally refers to the Manifesto as a phenomenon of cultural conservatism.
Both  interpretations  are  far  from  being  mistaken;  the  document  has  indeed  been
appropriated  as  the  Manifesto  of  New  Confucians,  and  it  also  articulate  certain
conservative intellectual trends. Despite this, I argue that these interpretations only grasp
partial features of the document, to the risk of oversimplifying and neglecting the overall
richness of its content.
Umberto Bresciani, in his study on New Confucian thinkers, states: “The leaders of
the  movement generally  are  mainly  concerned with  the  issues  raised by the impact  of
Western culture. Concerning their basic tenets in this respect, there is no better means of
getting  acquainted  with  them  than  reading  the  1958  Manifesto.”72 According  to  his
72 Bresciani 2001: 37.
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interpretation, the document presents the basic tenets of the movement as a whole, rather
than representing an independent cultural and philosophical analysis of Confucianism in a
global  context.  This  assumption,  I  maintain,  is  quite  problematic  and  misleading  for
several reasons that I shall here explain. The belief that the document aims to present the
basic  tenets  of  a  specific  philosophical  or  cultural  movement  seems to  be  partially  in
contrast  with the aim expressed in the first  section by the four authors;  as  mentioned
previously,  the  main  objective  in  issuing  the  Manifesto  was to  bring  about  a  better
understanding of Chinese Culture for Western intellectuals in order to integrate it into a
general world culture outlook.73 Indeed, as stated by Makeham, the document “argues for
the cross-cultural significance of Confucianism on a global scale.”74 In this perspective, the
Manifesto may be seen as the collective statement of a group of scholars that aim to create
a shared identity among intellectuals through a specific discourse building.  With this in
mind, it can make sense to think about the document as the magna carta of the movement
of New Confucians; this hypothesis, however, does not find confirmation in the text of the
Manifesto itself, since the authors do not explicitly mention the will to initiate or represent
a  specific  cultural  movement.  Furthermore,  the  term  'New  Confucianism'  in  all  of  its
variants (xiandai xin Ruxue 現代新儒學 dangdai xin Rujia 當代新儒家; dangdai xin Ruxue
當代新儒學; xiandai xin Rujia 現代新儒家) does not appear in the document, not even once,
and there are no references to earlier twentieth-century Confucian scholars such as Xiong
Shili and Liang Shuming who are considered to be the pioneers of the Confucian revival of
that period. Therefore the assumption of a consciously created movement on the basis of
the discourse articulated by the four authors can be hypothesized,  but it  does not find
supporting evidence in the Manifesto itself. This hypothesis seems to be problematic even
when considering New Confucianism as a movement in itself. This is because there is little
73 Makeham 2003: 1.
74  Makeham 2003: 28.
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evidence that the latter had attained the recognition of being an integrated philosophical
movement or school of thought before the late 1970s.75 In other words, it is highly probable
that  the  authors  of  the  Manifesto did  not  perceive  or  identify  themselves  with  “New
Confucianism”. We can however contemplate the possibility that, even though the authors
do not explicitly mention the will to create a cultural movement nor their identification
with it, they could have implicitly thought of creating a unified philosophical movement.
This idea could find supportive evidence in the fact that the document was first published
in Chinese. Apart from this, we can be more confident about the fact that the Manifesto
became a foundational document of what was later to be identified as a philosophical and
cultural movement.
A  second  category  of  interpretation  in  contemporary  scholarship  relies  on  a
discourse about cultural conservatism. Makeham, for example, briefly discuss “the cultural
conservatism  espoused  in  the  Declaration  [the  Manifesto].”76 This  is  because  the  four
scholars that co-signed the document were inclined to identify  Chinese civilization and
Chinese culture with one specific traditional trend, namely, Confucianism. For this reason,
when inquiring on the motives for the so called Neo-Confucian revival, social scientists and
cultural historians tend to make reference to the concept of cultural identity. According to
this  approach,  new  advocates  of  Confucianism  “become  anxious  to  reestablish  a
meaningful continuity with their own past in such a way that the shock of changes can be
absorbed and a compass be relocated within the self.”77 Addressing the concept of cultural
identity  may  shed  light  on  some  aspects  of  the  Manifesto,  as  well  as  on  the  later
development of the movement identified with it. Despite this, the need of “psychological
compensation”78 proper of cultural identity in relation to conservatism does not explain
why this is expressed in the specific forms of thought found in the Manifesto. With regard
75 Makeham 2003: 27.
76 Makeham 2003: 28.
77 Hao 1976: 278.
78 Hao 1976: 279.
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to this, Hao Chang states that “Given their preoccupation with defining Chineseness, there
remains the problem why people of New Confucian persuasion identify as they do with one
set of cultural ideals among many within the Chinese cultural tradition.”79 Makeham, still
relying  on  the  “conservatism  expressed  in  the  Manifesto”,  also  sustains  that  “the
Declaration rejects the positivist paradigm ushered in by modernity and Westernization.”80
Rejecting  Westernization  and  modernity,  however,  does  not  seem  to  be  a  central
preoccupation  for  the  authors  of  the  document,  at  least  not  in  the  text  itself.  On  the
contrary,  they  present  several  reasons  for  justifying  a  better  mutual  understanding
between Western and Chinese tradition of thought, which may eventually lead to a great
and harmonious world culture. Section eight of the Manifesto comes particularly useful in
critically  reassess  the  reference  to  the  rejection  of  a  “positivist  paradigm”.  Here,  the
authors do not reject Western positivism, but rather identify and discuss the limits of it in
relation to the historical development of Chinese culture. They recognize that the latter
necessitates a further scientific development which, according to them, was not regarded
as fundamental in the development of Chinese civilization until then. Interestingly enough,
the authors provide a philosophical explanation for China's lack of scientific development:
while in the West, since ancient Greece, knowledge became an independent value in itself
(seeking  knowledge  for  the  sake  of  knowledge),  China  always  emphasized  above  all
morality  and  value-judgment.  This  difference  in  the  basic  attitude  of  mind has  led  to
somehow divergent path, but it would be misleading to consider Chinese culture as anti-
scientific  or  rejecting  scientific  spirit  in  general.  Indeed,  the  Manifesto  argues  for  the
necessity of a partially autonomous scientific spirit in China as a fundamental complement
of its development.81  It is true that the document presents a critique of Western culture,
but this should not be considered the main issue, since such critique is only a preliminary
79 Hao 1976: 279.
80 Makeham 2003: 28.
81 Makeham 2003: 21.
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stage  of  the  authors'  goal:  to  bring  about  an understanding of  Chinese  culture  and to
integrate  it  into  a  general  world  outlook.  The  contemporary  scholar  Yu  Jiyuan  has
compared the Manifesto to the paper “Modern Moral Philosophy”, published by British
philosopher Anscombe in 1958. In his compared analysis of two discourse on virtue ethics
(as articulated in the Manifesto, on the one hand, and as discussed by Anscombe on the
other),  he  summarised  the  flaws  of  Western  culture  as  presented  in  the  Manifesto  as
follows:
Specifically, the problems presented are: (1) Pursuing  unlimitedly the outside
but failing to cultivate one’s inner virtues. Consequently, the spirit in the real
life  is  empty.  (2)  Valuing  the  abstract  reason,  but  disvaluing  the  subtle
emotional  life.  They  neglect  the  life’s  “intuitive  experience”  in  human
communications, and judge the richness of human life contents in terms of the
accumulation of concepts. (3) Stressing the universal principles of concepts, but
ignoring the uniqueness and specificity  of  things.  (4)  Focusing on the moral
rules and behaviors, but neglecting the impact of virtue. In short, the central
problem of the Western culture and ethics is that it takes the society and human
history as mere subject-matters of rational and objective study, and fails to pay
attention to the improvement of human subjectivity.82
The philosophical insights employed to inquire into the question of how to integrate
Western  and  Chinese  cultural  elements  seems  to  reveal  that  the  Confucian  revival
proposed in the Manifesto cannot be consider as mere conservative inertia. 
Looking at the development of Confucian tradition itself, it is possible to recognize a
82 Yu 2008: 320.
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always  reaffirmed  continuity  between  tradition  and  innovation.  To  be  sure,  New
Confucianism  differs  from  Neo-Confucianism  because  of  its  global  conception  and  its
employment of categories such as metaphysics, epistemology, ontology and so on, which
are  inherited  from  the  encounter  with  Western  philosophical  traditions.  Neo-
Confucianism,  in  turn,  differs  from  classical  Confucianism  (generally  identified  with
Confucius,  Mencius  and  Xunzi)  because  of  its  assimilation  of  Daoist  and  Buddhist
philosophy. In short, Confucianism has survived throughout history precisely because it
has  continuously  changed in  the  light  of  various  social,  cultural  and  political  contexts
while, on the other hand, remaining unified as a traditional social and philosophical trend.
That  is  to  say,  any form of  conservatism promoted in  the  Manifesto  does  not  prevent
cultural innovation or a renewal process of Confucian tradition in any sense.
Conclusion
The  philosophical  richness  of  the  Manifesto,  together  with  its  intercultural
significance,  prompt  us  to  move  beyond  interpretations  of  cultural  conservatism.  The
intellectual  differences  of  its  authors,  together  with  their  shared  concern  for  the
reconstruction of Confucianism, have resulted in the articulation of important innovative
discourses which blend tradition and modernity,  and concerning both Chinese cultural
elements and the corresponding Western understanding of those.
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Chapter 3
Overview of the Content of the Manifesto
Introduction
In order to comprehensively contextualize the Manifesto, together with the authors'
aims in issuing the document, it is useful to consider its overall content. In this chapter, as
well  as  in  the  following  ones,  I  will  quote  passages  from  the  English  version  of  the
Manifesto with the abbreviation 'M(e)' in footnotes. The text of the Manifesto is divided in
two parts, which in turn are organized in twelve sections:  
1. Preamble – our reasons for issuing the Manifesto (前言─我们发表此宣言之理由); 
2. Three best-known motives of  Westerners  who pursue Chinese  Studies  and their
shortcomings (世界人士研究中国学术文化之三种动机与道路及其缺点);
3. Affirmation of the spiritual life of Chinese history and culture (中国历史文化之精神生
命之肯定) ; 
4. Chinese philosophy and its relation to Chinese culture as differing from Western
systems (中国哲学思想在中国文化中之地位及其与西方文化之不同); 
5. The ethical, moral and religious spirit in Chinese Culture (中国文化之伦理道德与宗教
精神) ;
6.  The import of Chinese “Doctrine of transcendental mind” in moral practice (中国心
性之学的意义); 
7. Reasons governing durability of Chinese history and culture (中国历史文化所以长久之
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理由);
(Part II)
8. Development of Chinese culture in the natural sciences (中国文化之发展与科学);
9. Development of Chinese culture in national democratic reconstruction (中国文化之发
展与民主建国); 
10. Our understanding of China's current political history (我们对中国现代政治史之认识);
11. Our expectation from Western culture and what the West should learn from the
Oriental wisdom (我们对于西方文化之期望，及西方所应学习于东方之智慧者); 
12. What we hope for the formation of a new world of academic thought (我们对于世界
学术思想之期望).83 
The following chapter aims to provide the reader with a brief summary of the above listed
sections of the Manifesto.
(Part I)
1. “Preamble – our reasons for issuing the Manifesto.”
In the preamble of the document, the authors formulate their reasons for writing
and publishing the Manifesto.  Interestingly, they start the section by admitting that their
ideology “is not completely identical in all of its aspects”84, but that nevertheless they “hold
the same general  view and convictions toward Chinese culture.”85 We have seen in the
previous  chapter  some  of  their  disagreements  with  regard  to  the  first  draft  of  the
Manifesto, together with their different philosophical believes.
83 The English titles of the sections here reported are taken from the unabridged version published in the Taiwanese 
journal Chinese Culture (1962), here abbreviated as M(e) 1962.
84 M(e) 1962: 2.
85 M(e) 1962: 3.
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The writers also sustain that, according to them, many other intellectuals from both
China and abroad would agree on their views as articulated in the document, and therefore
they “shall not look at this ideology as an exclusive personal possession.”86 This statement
clearly  implies  the  authors'  will  to  assign  to  the  Manifesto  public  significance  and
justification. The preamble of the document is a fundamental section not only because it
articulates the aims of the authors in writing it, but also because it presents the authors'
expectations in terms of worldwide academic reactions to the publication: “The authors are
determined to present to the whole world the essence of our thought, with a request for all
intellectuals  to  give  their  own  impressions  and  reflections.”87 The  preamble  concisely
announce that the document (also named as the “declaration”) aims to present the author's
basic understanding of Chinese culture by discussing both its past and present situation, in
order  to  put  forward  expectations  about  its  future  outlook.  The  ultimate  goal  of  the
declaration,  the  authors  explain,  is  to   contextualize  Chinese  culture  within  the  future
development of world civilization. As already mentioned in the previous chapters, it should
be noted that even though the Manifesto refers to 'Chinese culture', the latter is often times
identified with Confucian tradition; this is also evident from the recurring references to
Classical  Confucianism  and  Neo-Confucianism  (in  comparison  to  which  references  to
Daoism or Buddhism, for example, are almost inexistent) throughout the sections of the
document.
2. “Three motives of Westerners who pursue Chinese studies and their
 shortcomings.”
The authors sustain that, especially starting from the 19th century, Chinese culture
has attracted Western scholars. However, despite their interest in the subject, sinologists
86 M(e) 1962: 3.
87 M(e) 1962: 3.
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both from China and abroad were not able to answer questions such as “Where is the
center of the Chinese cultural spirit?” or “What will be the direction of its development?” 88
This inability,  according to the  authors,  has in turn hindered scholarly  appreciation of
Chinese culture in its breath and depth. In the second section of the document, the authors
identify  three  main  approaches  of  Westerners  who pursued  Chinese  studies  and  their
consequences for the development of Sinology – starting from the Jesuit missionaries, who
introduced a more substantial knowledge of Chinese culture to the West in the 16 th and 17th
century. Since Jesuits' interest in China was moved by the aim of converting the locals to
Christianity,  the  authors  state,  their  view on Chinese  culture  was  biased by their  own
approach. Thus “They had, as a matter of fact, treated the Song-Ming Confucian principle
as identical with the current Western Rationalism, naturalism, or even materialism”89, and
their presentation found a warm reception by Western rationalist atheists rather than by
Kantian  idealists  who  were  actually  much  closer  to  it.  After  assessing  the  role  of  the
Jesuits,  the  authors  consider  the  approach  of  Western  sinologists  to  Chinese  culture
between  the  19th and  20th century;  according  to  them,  the  main  motivation  for  the
development of Sinology was curiosity “aroused by art works exported to the West or else
discovered on Chinese territory.”90 Even though much was accomplished in this way, yet
scholars  were  generally  not  in  contact  with  the  living and changing reality  of  Chinese
culture, and treated the latter as a dead object of study:
We  cannot  deny  that  the  intensive  effort  of  most  Western  sinologists  in
exploring, collecting and transporting various sort of Chinese antiques as source
materials for their research, was not directly concerned with the study of China
as a living nation or of Chinese culture in its changing mood; nor did it probe
88  M(e) 1962: 4.
89 M(e) 1962: 5.
90 M(e) 1962: 6.
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into  the  the  Chinese  cultural  life  and  spirit,  with  their  true  sources  and
directions of development carefully taken into consideration.91
According  to  the  authors  of  the  Manifesto,  this  lack  of  contact  was  enhanced  by  the
predominance  of  textual  criticism among Qing  scholars  and by  the  attitude  of  critical
evaluation of the past adopted by the Chinese scholars of the Republic.
The third approach taken into account concerns the more recent interest in modern
Chinese history shown by Westerners during the first half of the 20 th century.92 This line of
research, the authors say, was prompted by intensive international contact, and therefore
provided a relatively realistic standpoint of study. However, this approach suffered from
the great danger of explaining the whole of Chinese culture from its present situation, in
other words, of deducing the causes from the effects. Furthermore, an additional danger in
misinterpreting  'Chinese  culture'  consisted,  according  to  them,  in  the  subjective
interpretations of scholars due to the influential criticism of different political factions.
These 'three motives' listed by the authors can be considered as too simplistic and lacking
nuance, but the same could be said about the whole of the Manifesto which, considering
the great  variety  of  topics  treated in its  content,  appears to  be  brief  and concise.  The
relatively simplistic characterization of Western approaches to Chinese culture, however,
also reveals the author's main concerns with regard to the subject: 1) a concern about the
biased  reception  of  Chinese  culture  derived  from Christian  perspectives;  2)  a  concern
towards the effects of the spread of scientism and logical positivism on Chinese culture; 3)
a concern for the future cross-cultural significance of Chinese culture, and in particular of
Confucianism.
91 M(e) 1962: 6.
92 The authors state: “Since the Sino-Japanese war, many Western advisers to the Chinese government and foreign 
diplomats in China have been posing as leading figures in the study of modern Chinese history. Their motive has 
been primarily derived from the actual contact with Chinese political or social institution related to the international 
situation.” (M(e) 1962: 7.)
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3. “Affirmation of the Spiritual Life of Chinese History and Culture.”
The  opening  lines  of  the  third  section  of  the  Manifesto  are  powerful:  “Chinese
culture is a thing very much alive. We cannot deny that in the eyes of numerous Chinese as
well as Westerners, Chinese culture has been looked upon as a museum piece.”93 This is
because the main mistake made by students of Chinese Culture, according to the authors,
is  that  they wish to  emulate  an 'objective',  scientific  approach on the  one hand,  while
discrediting  the  approach  adopted  by  politicians  and  humanists  as  being  emotionally
involved  and 'subjective'  on  the  other  hand.  The  authors  state,  however,  that  only  an
attitude  of  sympathetic  understanding  and  concern  can  reveal  Chinese  culture  in  its
complexity; it  is therefore of vital importance for sinologists not to treat the subject as
detached from China's modern historical development (since “to dead eyes, all things are
dead!”94), but, as a scholar approaching Chinese Culture, it is important to be aware of the
“abnormal conditions in the stream of Chinese culture”95 (in other words, of its changes). It
is not clear, however, what these 'abnormal conditions' are: it is possible that the authors
were implicitly referring to the troubled historico-political context in which the Manifesto
was issued, but it is also possible to interpret these 'abnormal conditions' as the phases of
syncretism with different philosophical traditions which characterize the development of
Confucianism96.  The authors conclude the section with an important admonishment: “It is
essential that all academic scholars in this field examine their motives reflectively, for this
is the important hinge upon which the success or failure of their research depends.”97
93 M(e) 1962: 8.
94 M(e) 1962: 11.
95 M(e) 1962: 10.
96 For example the syncretism of classical Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism characterizing Neo-Confucianism, or
the syncretism of Western and Confucian philosophical framework characterizing New Confucianism.
97 M(e) 1962: 11.
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4. “Chinese philosophy and its relation to Chinese culture as differing 
from Western systems.” 
A fundamental  viewpoint expressed in the Manifesto is that the development of
Chinese thought embodies and reflects the development of Chinese culture; thus, in order
to acquire a true understanding of the latter, scholars must look at Chinese thought as an
organic whole, shaped throughout history, and not as a series of isolated phenomena.  Why
is the development of Chinese philosophical thought so important to gain understanding
of Chinese culture as a whole? The authors state:
We may ask: where is the nucleus of the spiritual life of the Chinese nation? Our
answer: it lies within the general thought or philosophy of the Chinese people.
This does not mean that prevailing Chinese thought or philosophy determines
the reality of China's culture and history. It means only that our research  must
begin with Chinese thought and philosophy if we are to attain an understanding
of the spiritual life of Chinese culture in its historical aspect. Hence, the main
road to  travel  in  studying Chinese culture  is  necessarily  a  philosophical  one,
developing outward layer upon layer.98
The authors contrast the underlying unity of Chinese thought with the fragmented roots of
modern  Western  culture,  which  are  found  in  Greek,  Roman,  Hebrew,  Germanic,  and
Islamic culture; this diversity eventually resulted in the isolated specialism that can be
found in Western philosophy. The general difference characterizing Chinese and Western
philosophical traditions, as identified in the Manifesto, must result in differentiating the
methods used by Western scholars in studying Chinese philosophy, which cannot be the
98 M(e) 1962: 12.
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same employed to study Western philosophical traditions.99 This section, similarly to the
other  ones,  is  very  brief  and  concise,  and  does  not  discuss  at  length  the  important
differences  between  Western  and  Chinese  philosophy.  It  does,  however,  argue  for  an
important  principle  which  will  be  functional  in  building  the  philosophical  framework
articulated in section VI: Chinese and Western philosophical traditions are different and,
as such, their study requires different methods.
5. “The Ethical, Moral, and Religious Spirit in Chinese culture.”
A widespread notion about Chinese culture, the authors state, is that it emphasized
the moral value of man and its importance in human relationships, more than it stresses
the relationship between man and God (as it  happens, for example,  in Christianity100).
According to the authors, this belief is generally correct. However, stating that Chinese
ethics lacks spiritual foundation and transcendental religious sentiment would indeed be a
grave mistake. This mistake, they explain, spread starting from the first contact with the
West  through  Jesuits'  missions  and  was  later  reinforced  with  the  modern  Chinese
intellectuals  of  the May Fourth Movement and their  successors.  Considering this,  it  is
important to notice that the religious-like character of Chinese culture cannot be equated
to  that  of  an  organized  Church  (as  found  in  the  West),  since  it  did  not  develop
autonomously. Again, the fact that China did not develop an independent tradition in such
way   -  or  a  priestly  tradition  comparable  to  that  of  Christianity,  does  not  mean that
99 “We now arrive at one definite conclusion: since Chinese culture traces its source to a unitary system, the formula 
for expressing its spiritual life must be different from that expressing Western cultural life, which latter has its roots 
in diverse soils.”  (M(e) 1962: 15.)
100With regard to Christianity, the authors state: “According to our viewpoint, it is unquestionable that China lacked 
the Western-type Church system and religious wars. Christianity since the Middle Ages, with its diversified practices
and acute conflicts, has been developing and independent religious culture from its Hebrew heritage.” (M(e) 1962: 
17.)
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Chinese culture lacks religious sentiment (“Is not human faith in Tao exactly the same as
the religious belief in a supernatural order?”101). On the contrary, the authors state that “It
is very obvious that China's ancient classics emit a profound sense of reverence toward
God and true faith in Heaven.”102 In the underlying continuity of Chinese thought, the
religious and the ethical were inseparable complements, as the authors explain:
After all, we hope that Western sinologists would pay due attention not only to
Chinese realistic norms for the regulation of conduct among men for upholding
their social or political order, but also to the ideology in the norms involving the
application  of  “unity  of  Heaven and  Man”,  with  which  the  moral  practice  is
endowed also with the religious-like faith in Tao.103
6.  “The  import  of  the  Chinese  'Doctrine  of  transcendental  mind'  in  
moral practice.” 
Section  VI  of  the  Manifesto  is  characterized  by  an  impressive  philosophical
richness,  both  in  terms  of  Chinese  thought  and  comparative  philosophy,  and  more
attention will be devoted to it in chapter 4 and 5. The section deals with the doctrine of
human nature (心性之学  xinxing zhi xue), also rendered in English as the doctrine of
'Chinese Rationalism'; the authors maintain that this doctrine, which was well articulated
by  Neo-Confucian  thinkers,  was  misunderstood  in  Western  scholarship  as  a  kind  of
naturalism  or  even  materialism  when,  in  fact,  it  is  much  closer  to  the  philosophical
systems  developed  by  Baruch  Spinoza.  This  comparison,  the  authors  explain,  further
101M(e) 1962: 20. I think the idea of 'supernatural' here is misleading. As we shall see later on (chapter 4 and 5) the 
authors argue that the idea of 'supernatural' found, say, in Christianity, does not resemble the character of immanence
found in Chinese thought. This conception is usually related to transcendental immanence.
102M(e) 1962: 17.
103M(e) 1962: 18.
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clarifies the core notion of 'Unity of Heaven and Man', which is of fundamental importance
in understanding the continuity characterizing Chinese thought as a whole. Even though
the section also makes reference to German Idealism, we will see later on (chapter 5) how
the reference to Spinoza's rationalism clarifies the strategic translation of xinxing zhi xue
as 'rationalism'.
7. “ Reasons governing the durability of Chinese history and culture.”
The authors present several reasons for the durability of Chinese culture; according
to them, some has maintained that such durability was to be attributed to the emphasis on
practical  life,  in contrast  with the idea of  pursuing a transcendental  religious realm104;
others sustained that the long duration of Chinese culture was due to its conservatism.105
Many other  explanations  could  be  listed,  but  according  to  the  authors'  viewpoint  “the
culture  of  any  nation  is  the  expression  of  its  spiritual  life  and  has  for  its  nucleus  its
ideology pure and simple. Therefore, the answer to the problem must be found in Chinese
ideology.”106 For this reason, rather than stating that Chinese culture stresses practical life
and is not interested in the transcendental, we should state that Chinese thought always
strove  to  safeguard  practical  life  by  means  of  a  transcendent  mood.  According  to  the
authors,  rather  than ascribing the  durability  of  Chinese  culture  to outward causes,  we
should ascribe it to the various self-conscious views of life as found in Chinese thought.
These views, the authors state, are abundantly displayed by the classical thought of the
Warring States Period (475-221 BC), mainly embodied by the utilitarian Daoism and the
Confucian concern of building just relationships among men.
104“Someone has said, that the durability of Chinese culture and history was chiefly due to the Chinese people's 
emphasis on the maintenance of a realistic life, as different from the Western culture which was devoted more to the 
pursuit of idealism or a Christian paradise.” (M(e) 1962: 27.)
105However, the authors state that the perpetuation of Chinese civilization should not “be interpreted as a mere habitof 
conservatism.” (M(e) 1962: 32.)
106M(e) 1962: 28.
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Here,  the authors display  a  concern towards the misunderstanding according to
which Chinese thought does not display the same emphasis on the transcendental that
Western  traditions  developed.  This,  however,  should  be  understood  as  a  different
configuration  of  the  Western  dualism  immanent/transcendent;  in  other  words,  the
pragmatic  character  of  Chinese  thought  (and,  in  particular,  of  Confucianism,  does  not
exclude the development of forms of idealism at the same time. Interestingly, with regard
to  the  latter  the  authors  state  that  they  acknowledge  “the  many  shortcomings  in  the
idealistic phase of Chinese culture107 and we admit defects in its realistic application.”108
(Part II)
8. “ Development of Chinese culture in the natural sciences.”
In the Manifesto, the authors acknowledge that “historical Chinese culture lacked
the modern Western democratic system, Western scientific study, and the current practical
skills  in  technology.”109 For  these  reasons,  they  continue,  China  did  not  attain
modernization and industrialization as found in Europe and North America. Despite this,
it should not be concluded that Chinese culture is anti-scientific; it had, in fact, a relatively
high degree of technical development before the 18th century. It has to be noted, however,
that the basic spirit of Western science – originating from the Greek notion of “seeking
knowledge for the sake of knowledge”110 - shaped an objective or ideal realm for its pursuit.
This attitude, in turn, enabled the knowing subject to distance himself from the moral and
religious subject; such attitude, the authors state, was not sufficiently developed in China,
107It is not entirely clear what is the 'idealistic phase of Chinese culture'. It is possible to speculate, however, that the 
authors had in mind the period of Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties, during which Neo-
Confucianism flourished.
108M(e) 1962: 34.
109M(e) 1962: 35.
110M(e) 1962: 36.
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which stressed above all morality and value judgment (“A basic reason why China lacked
the  Western  scientific  spirit  is  that  ancient  Chinese  thought  over-emphasized  the
combined  teaching  and  practice  of  moral  principles.”111).  Starting  from  these
considerations,  section  VIII  recognizes  the  need  for  China  to  develop  a  relatively
autonomous scientific spirit, framed within a balanced unity of morality and epistemology:
If the Chinese really want to set themselves up as a moral subject they must try
also to set themselves up as an epistemological subject [...] The human moral
subject  must  elevate  itself  to  such a  status of  controlling its  own forward or
backward actions together with the advancement or retreat of its epistemological
activities. In that exalted status the moral subject may attain its supreme role.
This is what we call the greatest benevolence of mankind (仁 ren).112
9.   “Development  of  Chinese  culture  in  national  democratic  
reconstruction.”
In its earliest stage, China was governed by means of feudalism; later  monarchy
prevailed, from the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC) until 1911. During the Empire, sovereignty
was vested in the ruler, not in the people.  Yet, the authors state, we cannot assume that
Chinese culture lacks an inherent tendency towards democracy: the idea of the people's
will  as  representing  the  will  of  Heaven,  in  fact,  is  found  already  in  Chinese  ancient
philosophies113 (“It is unjustifiable to assert that there was no democratic seed latent in
111M(e) 1962: 36-37.
112M(e) 1962: 38-39.
113The authors here refer to the Mandate of Heaven (tianming 天命), a prominent notion of Confucian political thought.
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Chinese culture, because both Confucian and Taoist political thought had confirmed that
the ruler should never abuse his power.”114). A bridge between the ruler and society was
built  by means of developing a sophisticated bureaucratic system, with figures such as
officials and censors as constituting an effecting check on the ruler's power. Considering
that  the  democratic  tendency  of  Chinese  culture  can  be  seen  from  the  early  political
thought, the authors state that the development of democracy is an inner necessity already
contained in the spirit of Chinese thought.
10.  “Our understanding of China's current political history.”
According to the authors' viewpoint “It is self-evident that the Chinese people want
democratic rule”115. Thus, they continue, “The present burning question is: as the Chinese
people have been aspiring for democracy, why is it that democratic constitutionalism could
not yet be realized in the past several decades of Chinese history?” 116A main reason for the
failure of democracy, according to them, is the estrangement of the intellectuals from the
people;  in  addition  to  this,  the  authors  also  point  out  the  iconoclasm  of  modern
intellectuals led by Chen Duxiu117 against Chinese ancient cultural heritage. The cultural
pattern supported by such intellectuals was not rooted in the cultural tradition of China,
but was rather based on Marxist thought – which was dominating Chinese thought since
the mid-twenties. According to the authors, Communism succeeded on a wave of reaction
against Western imperialism, and not because it was a natural and direct development of
Chinese cultural thought and of the basic spiritual demands of the Chinese people. 118 Thus,
114M(e) 1962: 41.
115M(e) 1962: 45.
116M(e) 1962: 45.
117Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (1879-1942) was a founder of the Chinese Communist Party.
118“Communism basically was not indigenous in China. […] Ever since the 19th century China actually had suffered 
from an invasion of Western capitalism and, in due course, became the victim of foreign imperialism.” (M(e) 1962: 
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in  the  authors'  perspective,  the  people  accepted  Marxist-Leninist  thought  for  negative
reasons, and therefore it should be conceived as a temporary tool for the fulfillment of the
true demand of the people:
Communism itself was not accepted in its positive aspect  because it ran counter
to the proper or objective demand of the spiritual life of the Chinese people. […]
But the Communists succeeded in the scheme precisely because of [the people's]
democratic aspiration.119
11. “Our expectation from Western culture and what the West should  
learn from the Oriental wisdom.”
The  Manifesto  acknowledges  that  Western  culture  has  become  synonymous  of
modern culture, particularly since the 19th century.120 But together with its creativity and
rapid progress, Western culture also brings along its problems and clashes. Even though it
has to be acknowledge that the West has solved many of its difficulties (such as religious
wars), according to the authors the world's division into two blocks – with uncommitted
Asian nations in between – is the main present issue to take into account. Considering
that, they continue, Chinese, Indian and Muslim cultures are akin to the Western anti-
materialist attitude, we should consider the reasons why these nations have not sided with
the West in the context of the Cold War. The main reason for this can be found in Western
colonial  past  during which,  while  spreading its  cultural  influence worldwide,  the  West
49.)
119M(e) 1962: 49.
120“By applying the theory of scientific progress to reconstruction of the natural world and to reformation of social, 
political and economic ills, their reciprocal utilitarian practices resulted in mutual achievements of greater feats. 
Hence, Western culture in the past  one or two hundred years has surged forward, greatly surpassing and leaving 
behind all other traditional cultures in the world. This Western cultural advancement has universal and perpetual 
academic value which deserves the respect, acclamation, study and imitation of all other peoples over the globe.” 
(M(e) 1962: 53.)
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tried to impose its ready-made ideals regardless of the peculiar nature of other peoples'
cultures:
One real defect in the Western spirit lies in a straightforward attempt to spread
their culture uniformly over the entire globe, despite conflicts with traditional
characteristics  of  other  cultures.  Hence,  Westerners  lacked  respect  and
sympathetic understanding for other peoples' cultures. They usually ignored the
latter's genuine demand for self-development, and thus neglected also the value
assessment of Western culture toward others.121
In the authors' perspective, Western colonial past and its consequential attitude towards
other cultures has made East-West relations fruitless and unsympathetic. In order to gain
a truly intimate contact with the Chinese people, the authors maintain, a Westerner must
progress  beyond  his  own  cultural  heritage  and  learn  five  things  from  the  'Oriental
Wisdom': 1) the spirit of acceptance of the present without always striving for change and
progress, since the sense of progress should be accompanied by a sense of retreat; 2) a
continuous and dynamic movement between the specific and the general, a concept well
expressed by Bergson's notion of intuition; 3) a feeling of mildness and compassion; 4)
acknowledging the continuous endurance of culture by means of historical consciousness
and self-awareness; 5) the notion of tolerance, as in conceiving the whole of mankind as a
family - a basic tenet of Confucian thought.
121M(e) 1962: 55.
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12.  “  What  we hope for the formation of  a  new World of Academic  
Thought.”
In the concluding section, the authors present three main points concerning what
they hope to find in the future direction of both Chinese and world academic development:
1) self-reflection and the subsequent acquisition of a wider vision which includes respect
for other cultures,  in order to pave the way for an organic common concern for every
nations' respective problems; 2)the development of a study which unites knowledge and
moral conduct, and that might be inspired by the existentialist thinking; 3) the recognition
of the human being as a moral subject which is able to transcend itself in order to gain a
more unified and organic understanding of both the world and humans' role in it.
Conclusion
From the brief overview of the twelve sections of the Manifesto, as reported above,
it is possible to note the great variety of topics considered in the text: the place of religion
in  Chinese  thought,  prospects  of  scientific  development,  considerations  about  the
establishment  of  a  democratic  political  system,  and  so  on  and  so  forth.  Despite  the
authors' disagreement with respect to some issues122, they nevertheless shared a Confucian
heritage which, as we have discussed earlier, was seen as the ground upon which China
could build its future development. An essential component of such ground, according to
the authors, is Chinese philosophy, and therefore they state that “The main road to travel
in  studying  Chinese  culture  is  necessarily  a  philosophical  one.”123 Thus,  in  the  next
following two chapters of this work I will  consider the philosophical  framework of the
122As discussed in chapter 2, Xu Fuguan did not agree on Tang Junyi's first draft for two reasons: first, according to Xu
the draft did not emphasize enough the democratic character of Chinese culture; second, he considered the place of 
religion in Chinese culture as being to emphasized.
123M(e) 1962: 11.
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Manifesto  –  with  particular  reference  to  section  VI  –  in  order  to  clarify  the  authors'
doctrine of Chinese Rationalism (Zhongguo xinxing zhi xue).
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Chapter 4
Whose Confucianism?
Defining the Philosophical Framework of the Manifesto
Introduction
The first part of this work was devoted to provide the reader with the fundamental
historical context and conceptual framework in which the Manifesto was conceived and
issued;  this  was an essential  way to go in order to contextualize the document and its
content. With this in mind, I can now move to the assessment of a particular section of the
Manifesto,  namely  section  VI,  entitled  “The  Import  of  the  Chinese  Doctrine  of
Transcendental Mind in Moral practice” (Zhongguo xinxing zhi xue de yiyi 中国心性之学的
意 义 ).  Even  though  this  is  not  the  only  section  of  the  document  displaying  rich
philosophical  content124 it  is  here  that  the  authors  systematize  a  specific  philosophical
discourse through the elaboration of a 'Chinese Rationalism' (Zhongguo xinxing zhi xue 中
国 心 性 之 学 ).  Because  of  the  fact  that  the  Manifesto  is  a  brief  and  dense  text,  its
philosophical references are not elaborated extensively. This, in addition to the different
terminology  employed  in  the  Chinese  and  English  version  of  the  text,  might  prevent
readers from grasping its content clearly and easily.
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapters,  the  authors  of  the  document  regarded
Confucian  tradition  as  the  core  of  Chinese  culture,  and  even  though  they  do  discuss
Buddhism and Daoism in some passages, their most consistent concern throughout the
124Other examples are sections IV “Chinese Philosophy and its Relation to Chinese Culture as Differing from Western
Systems” - 中国哲学思想在中国文化中之地位及其与西方文化之不同 - and V “The Ethical, Moral, and Religious Spirit in
Chinese Culture” -  中国文化之伦理道德与宗教精神.
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Manifesto is the reconstruction of Confucianism in the light of 20th century socio-political
and historical developments. In order to develop this project effectively in such a concise
way, the authors could not discuss the whole of Confucian tradition, which, despite its
continuity,  is  nevertheless  long  and  diversified.  Instead,  they  focused  on  some
fundamental  notions  as  exemplifying  the  nucleus  of  Confucianism,  in  order  to  further
elaborate those notions in the light of Western philosophical tradition. In this chapter we
will examine the most recurring philosophical concepts of section VI by looking at their
historical  development,  in  order  to  further  elaborate  and  eventually  clarify  the
philosophical  framework  discussed  in  the  Manifesto.  The  first  paragraph  takes  into
account the character li 理 , often translated as 'pattern', 'principle' or 'reason'; I will also
discuss  the  meaning  of  two  related  compounds  found  in  the  Chinese  version  of  the
document, namely  yili  義理 (rendered in the English text as 'Righteousness in terms of
Reason') and liqi  理氣 ('Reason and Vital Spirit'). In the second paragraph, we elaborate
the notion of 'Mind and Nature' (xinxing 心性), which is rendered in the English version of
the Manifesto as 'rationalism' and is  considered by the authors as 'the very nucleus of
Chinese academic study'.125 Such rationalism is said to be the explanation for the formula
“Unity between Heaven and Man” (Tian ren heyi 天人合一), which will be discussed in the
last paragraph. A comprehensive picture of the fundamental philosophical notions of the
document is functional to understand how the doctrine of 'Chinese Rationalism' does not
appear  to  be  a  mere poor  and imprecise  translation,  but  rather  a  strategic  conceptual
translation.
125M(e) 1962 : 21.
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4.1  理 li: an Ordered Metaphysics
Li  (principle, pattern, reason) is a fundamental character in Confucianism, and it
became the main subject of philosophical inquiry starting from the Northern Song period
(960-1126); it is not a case, in fact, that Song-Ming Confucianism (also known as Neo-
Confucianism) is generally called the 'School of Principle' (理學 lixue). Even though there
is general agreement among scholars with regard to the above mentioned translations of
the character, I agree with Cua when he states that “because there is no literary English
equivalent, one cannot assume that  li  has a single, easily comprehensible use in Chinese
discourse.”126 It is thus useful to look at the etymology of the word:
The traditional etymology of  li  is 'to dress jade' or 'veins in jade'; the grain of
wood is a common illustration. Li is usually translated as 'principle', while some
authors prefer 'pattern' or 'order'. Another choice is 'coherence' because of the
nuances of 'reason' found in li. The verbal meaning 'to put in order, to arrange' is
also instructive. Li is a self-demonstrating concept, like the idea of an idea, but
firmly grounded in the specific actuality of things and events. It is the protean
character of li as a basic pattern that stimulates Neo-Confucian thought.127
Before the Northern-Song Confucians Cheng Hao (1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107)
focused on li as unifying principle, the character was already found in several ancient texts
as to indicate the diverse patterns of particular things; the Book of Changes (Yijing 易經)
refers to the regular patterns in the cycles of nature, the Zuo Qiuming's Commentary on
the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu Zuo zhuan 春秋左轉) identifies the regularities in
126Cua 2013: 631.
127Yao 2003: 355.
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history, while the  Book of Rites (Liji  禮記 ) describes patterns of social norms and ritual
obligations.  In  ancient  times,  not  only  literati  discussed  li;  Zhuangzi  25,  for  example,
mentions 'the many patterns of the myriad things' (wanwu shul 萬物殊理).128 The character
is also found in the  Mengzi,  where it  refers to “any aesthetically and ethically pleasing
order,  including  articulate  speech  (7B19),  musical  harmony  (5B1.6)  or  social  order
(6A7.8).”129
Beside these early articulations of li, it is with Neo-Confucian thinkers that we find
the character used as the foundation for the construction of a moral metaphysics. Cheng
Hao's usage of the term li is comprehensive of both particular and universal dimensions; in
her  recent  Neo-Confucianism:  Metaphysics,  Mind,  and  Morality (2018),  philosophy
professor JeeLoo Liu  has noticed that “Cheng Hao gave the notion of principle a moral
dimension that makes it comparable to the concept of Dao”130, while particular principles
are conceived as the paradigm of each thing – also thought of as the nature (xing 性) of
things. His brother, Cheng Yi, introduced one of the most fundamental slogans of Neo-
Confucianism as a comment to Zhang Zai's  Western Inscription  (Ximing 西銘 ), namely,
“Principle is one but its manifestations are many” (li yi wan shu 理一萬殊).131 This slogan is
of fundamental importance as the articulation of a worldview based on cohesiveness and
unification; the epistemology of such worldview, as expressed in the notion of li, became
the central focus of Neo-Confucian discourse. However, it is important to consider that the
unifying  perspective  of  Cheng  Yi's  statement  also  includes  a  certain  conception  of
particular principles; Liu has rightly identified different interpretations of such statement,
and with regard to particular principles she refers to “the raison d'être for each thing in the
overall  existence  of  the  world”,  since  she  notices  that  “on  some  occasions,  Cheng  Yi
128Yao 2003: 355.
129Van Norden 2009: 204.
130Liu 2018: 86
131Liu 2018: 88. Liu importantly points out that “This phrase is different from Cheng Yi's other phrase which is often 
conflated with it: 'Principle is one, but each one's due is different' (理一分殊 li yi fen shu).”
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specifically defines particular principles as 'what makes it  so'  (suoyiran 所以然 )”.132 In
summary,  Cheng  Yi  conceptualizes  one  principle  with  multiple  manifestations  as  a
coherent  pattern  which  manifests  its  particularities  as  conditions  of  being  for  each
particular thing. After the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi (1130-1200) further developed the study
of the principle; as a comment to the phrase “extension of knowledge” (zhizhi 致知) in the
Great Learning (Daxue 大学) he states:
If  we  wish  to  extend  our  knowledge  to  the  utmost,  we  must  investigate
exhaustively the li of things...It is only because we have not exhausted the li of all
things that our knowledge is still incomplete.133
In this passage, li is used with specific connotation (shili 事理 , “the li of things”). The use
of li as a specific term is emphasized by the contrast Zhu Xi made between li and dao in
two terse sentences: 1)  Dao is a holistic word (daozi hongda 道字宏大 );  li  is a word for
details (lizi jingmi 理字精密 ); 2)  Dao  is a unifying term (tongming 通名 ),  li is [a term
referring to its] details.”134 On the basis of this considerations, I agree with Cua when he
states that “Zhu Xi's remarks suggest that  li is a generic term functionally equivalent to
“reason”, which can be contextually specified either as a descriptive-explanatory term or as
a normative term. This suggestion has partial support in the modern Chinese notion of
liyou 理由 , meaning 'reason', 'ground', or 'rationale'.”135Thinking of li  in terms of 'reason'
132Liu 2018: 90.
133Cua 2003: 632.
134Cua 2003: 633.
135Cua further states: “since the two basic uses of li represent the exercise of reason in the generic sense – that is, as a 
distinctive capacity of the human mind exemplified in such mental acts as thinking, deliberating, inferring, and 
judging – rendering li as a functional equivalent of “reason” is plausible.” (Cua 2003: 634.)
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can make sense. Reason is a prominent notion in Western philosophy: in the context of
European Rationalism, reason can loosely be understood as that through which all beings
make sense of the world. For example, according to the philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-
1677)  reason  is  linked  to  the  type  of  cognition136 through  which  we  acquire  common
notions (through which beings are related). Considering that li, as we have discussed, has
both particular  and communal  connotation,  it  makes  sense  to think of  it  as  somehow
conceptually resembling the notion of 'reason'.137
In the Manifesto,  li  is considered in the form of three main compounds:  yili 義理 ,
liqi 理氣, and tianli 天理. The first compund (yili) is rendered in the English translation as
“righteousness in terms of reason”:
We may proceed to talk about Chinese Rationalism, or the learning of “Moral
Mind and Moral Reason”. This was another phase of the so-called “Yi-Li” study,
or  the study of  “Righteousness in  terms of  Reason”.  It  may be treated as  a
discourse on the origin of the fundamental principle of “What ought to be”.138
The literature available does not offer a clear and unanimous explanation of yili zhi xue 義
理之学 (the study of yili); philosophy scholar Xinzhong Yao vaguely defines it as “the study
of  principle  and philosophy”139,  history  and philosophy professor  On-cho Ng speaks  of
136Spinoza differentiates three types of knowledge: the first type (imagination) is that through which we form 
'inadequate ideas'; the second type is reason; the third type is intuitive knowledge, which is sometimes compared by 
commentators to mystical experiences.
137The concept of family resemblance, theorized by Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, can be functional to 
understand this type of conceptual resemblance.
138M(e) 1962: 20 (emphasis mine). In the Chinese text this goes as follows: “我们从中国人对于道之宗教性信仰，便可转
到论中国之心性之学。此心性之学，是中国古所谓义理之学之又一方面，即论人之当然的义理之本源所在者。”Even though
yi is very often translated as 'righteousness' and the latter is also the translation found throughout the Manifesto, Lau 
reports tha the Zhongyong 中庸 (the Doctrine of the Mean) in chapter 14 refers to yi as 'fitting' (義者宜也 yi zhe yi 
ye). In Lau 1970: 262.
139Yao 2000: 117.
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“moral  speculative  philosophy”140,  while  philosophy  professor  Wilson  translates  it  as
“learning of Meaning and Principle”.141 This latter translation is also used by Chung-Ying
Cheng, Hawai'i based scholar in Chinese philosophy, in his article on yili zhi xue contained
in the Encyclopedia of Confucianism vol. II (2003), in which he refers to Mengzi speaking
of the heart/mind of human beings (xin) that enjoys principles and righteousness (li yi),
namely the “principles of reason and righteousness, which are the foundations of a human-
nature-based  morality.”142 Thus,  it  seems  that  'Righteousness  in  terms  of  Reason'  as
mentioned  in  the  Manifesto  refers  to  the  capacity  of  human  beings  to  grasp  the
righteousness embedded within the principle (i.e. the order and harmony) of the universe.
In other words, morality has to be understood as a foundation of the very structure of
reality.
The second compound (liqi) is rendered in the English version of the Manifesto as
“Reason and Vital Spirit”143,  but it  is more commonly translated as “principle and vital
force”.144 Prior to the Cheng-Zhu school, Zhang Zai (1020-1077) related li  to the material
and vital stuff of which the phenomenological world is made of. In his Western Inscription
(Ximing  西銘 ), Zhang Zai  describes how the cosmic fluctuations and mutations of  qi
inherently  contained  the  coherent  ordering  principle  expressed  in  li:  “Though  the
condensation and dispersion of  the  Ether  [qi]  of  the  universe pushes  forward along a
hundred different roads, its Principle (for doing so) is orderly and real.”145  . Unfortunately,
he never fully articulated the relation between these two concept. Zhu Xi, on the other
140Ng. 2001: 1.
141Yao 2003: 256.
142Cheng differentiates the two compounds liyi and yili stating that “li yi is concerned with how to reach principles of 
righteousness by reason (from li to yi), whereas yi li 義理 (meanings and reasons/principles) is about how to reach 
principles of understanding by meanings (from yi to li). (Yao 2003: 763.)
143M(e) 1962: 22.
144See for example Yao 2003: 365.
145As reported in Feng 1953: 482. Feng Youlan makes and interesting comparison between the relationship of li and qi 
and the interaction of matter and form in Greek philosophy: “Formulated in Greek philosophical terminology, qi is 
matter, li is form, and the imposition of form upon matter is what makes possible the coming to be of concrete 
particular objects.”
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hand, further elaborated their interaction considering  li as the ontological ground of  qi's
operation:
What  are  called  principle  and  qi are  certainly  two  different  entities.  But
considered from the standpoint of things, the two entities are merged one with
the other and cannot be separated with each other in a different place. However,
this does not destroy the fact that the two entities are each an entity in itself.
When considered from the standpoint of principle, before things existed, their
principles of being had already existed. Only their principles existed, however,
but not yet the things themselves.146
Thus,  even  though  the  principle  is  considered  prior  to  qi,  it  is  their  co-operative
functioning  that  constitutes  the  world,  or,  in  Chan's  words,  “makes  the  universe  a
cosmos”.147
Among 20th century Confucian scholars, Tang Junyi devoted great part of his work
in studying the evolution of li, identifying six distinct but correlated meanings: wenli 文理,
principle in cultural activities; mingli 明理, principle in logical reasoning and philosophical
speculation; kongli 空理, principle of sunyata (emptiness); xingli 性理, principle of nature;
shili 事 理 ,  principle  of  events  or  affair; wuli 物 理 ,  principle  of  physics  or  empirical
sciences.148 Among these binomials, JeeLoo Liu considers that the  li  that Neo-Confucian
146Zhu Xi in Liu 2018: 98.
147Chan 1986: 58. In another essay contained in this same work, Chan gives an instructive and concise definition of li 
and qi: “Briefly stated, li is the universal principle underlying all things, the universal law governing all things, the 
reason behind all things. It is at once the cause, the form, the essence, the sufficient reason for being, the highest 
standard for all things, that is, their great Ultimate, or Taiji. It is self-caused, indestructible, eternal. There is nothing 
without it. It combines all things as one. It is manifest everywhere. It is fully embodied in the mind. Qi, on the other 
hand, is the material, particularizing principle, the concretion, expression, and operation of li. It provides the 
conditions for the production, evolution, and destruction of things. It gives them substantiality and individuality. It 
differentiates them.” (Chan1986: 137.)
148As reported in Cua 2003: 364.
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philosophers  talked  about  was  precisely  xingli  as  the  paradigm  of  human  nature,  in
contrast to the Taoist  xuanli  and the Buddhist kongli.149 Tang Junyi also considered the
significance of li in the late nineteenth century, after the introduction of Western scientific
thought and philosophy, reporting the Chinese translation of various Western concepts.
Here,  “reason”  was  translated  as lixing 理 性 –  where  xing  is  generally  rendered  as
“human nature”.150 It is interesting to notice that, even though li has been conceptualized
in terms of reason, the authors of the Manifesto are more focused on its relation to human
nature,  rather  than  the  principle's  metaphysical  status  per  se,  so  much  so  that  they
identified human heart/mind and nature (xinxing  心性) with 'rationalism'.
4.2  心性 xinxing: the Mind and the Nature
As mentioned above, section VI of the Manifesto is devoted to the importance of
what the authors call the doctrine of (Chinese) Rationalism , xinxing zhi xue 心性之学 –
which  seems  to  be  an  interesting  translation,  considering  that  'rationalism'  is  more
commonly used in reference to European thinkers such as Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza.
As Deborah Sommer (professor in religious studies) has noticed, “In later imperial times,
the expression 'learning of the mind and the nature' (xinxing zhi xue) referred to Song
learning.”151 However,  it  is  clear  that  such  expression  throughout  the  Manifesto,  and
especially  in  the  section  mentioned  above,  is  employed  as  a  reference  to  Song-Ming
Confucianism  (Song  Ming  Ru 宋 明 儒 ),  and  therefore  encompasses  the  philosophical
discourse  of  both  Song  and  Ming  thinkers.152  Song-Ming  Neo-Confucianism  is  often
149Cua 2003: 366.
150Cua 2003: 635.
151Yao 2003: 690.
152It is interesting that in Bodde's translation of Feng 1953: 500, li xue and xin xue are categorized respectively as 
'Rationalistic School' and 'Idealistic School'.
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divided into two major schools: these are  li xue  理學 or xing xue 性學 (the 'learning of
principle' or the School of nature) and xin xue 心學 (the 'learning of heart/mind' or the
School of mind). The two schools are also known by the name of their great proponents,
respectively Cheng-Zhu school (discussed in the previous section) and Lu-Wang school –
from  Lu  Jiuyuan  (1139-1193)153 and  Wang  Shouren  (1472-1529).154 Both  traditions
considered  the  principle  as  the  fundamental  metaphysical  source  of  reality,  but  they
differed in articulating the relationship between  li and human beings;  li xue considered
human nature (xing) as the locus of li, while xin xue argued that the latter is found in the
heart/mind (xin).
Philosophy professor Kwong-loi Shun, in reference to the character  xing, explains
that it is “derived from sheng [生], meaning 'life' or 'growth', and eventually acquiring the
meaning of livelihood, tendencies characteristic of things of a kind and and tendencies
with  which  a  thing  is  born.”155 In  Zhu  Xi's  cosmology,  individual  human  beings  (and
individual beings in general) are the result of particularized principle contained in qi, and
that is why he states that “There is no single thing in the world which does not have the
nature. That is to say, when there is a thing, there must be its nature; when there is no
thing,  there  is  then no nature.”156 Before Zhu Xi,  Cheng Yi  expressed his  fundamental
conviction that the essence of human nature is  li,  by stating that “Nature is Principle”
(xing ji  li  性即理 ).157 Following  this  equation of  human nature  and principle,  Zhu Xi
considered the latter as originally embodying the Confucian virtues of humaneness (ren
153Also known as Lu Xiangshan.
154Also known as Wang Yangming.
155Shun in Cua 2003: 554. Shun concisely reports that “While it has become standard for Chinese thinkers  to use 
renxing [人性] or just xing, to discuss human nature, views on human nature can also be expressed through other 
concepts or distinctions, such as sheng (life) in the chapter Jie of the Guanzi, the reference in the Mozi to what 
people where like in ancient times when they were first born and when government had not yet been instituted, or 
the contrast in the Zhuangzi between what is due to heaven (tian) and what is due to human beings (ren). Views on 
human nature are implicit in these texts, even though the character xing does not occur or does not play a prominent 
role in them.”
156As reported in Feng 1953: 551.
157Wood in Cua 2003: 699.
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仁), righteousness (yi 義), ritual propriety (li 禮) and wisdom (zhi 智). We have seen in the
previous section how morality was considered to be an essential part of the structure of the
cosmos; with that in mind, we can understand how, according to these thinkers, human
nature not only provides access to such morality, but is in fact the very source of it, since
particularized principles are nevertheless (the) Principle. In contrast with xing, the mind
(xin) could become clouded by emotions and desires , but could be clarified and redirected
to conform to normative principles by means of clear understanding of the world through
a process of self-cultivation:
Question: 'Is (man's) intellectual faculty (ling chu  靈處 ) the mind or is it the
nature? Answer: 'The intellectual faculty is the mind alone and not the nature.
For the nature is nothing but Principle.'158
On the other hand, the Lu-Wang school regarded the differentiation between nature and
mind as unessential, and considered  xin  (rather than  xing) as equating the Principle.159
According to Wang Yangming, the mind – as manifestation of li – grounds reality because
it is that through which human beings operate distinctions and categorizations, therefore
he asks: “Is there any affair in the world outside of the mind?”160 The mind, then, is the
principle that gives meaning to the world and structures it, and there is no transcendent
realm beyond what  xin perceives and organizes. While Zhu Xi based his dual cosmology
giving priority to  the principle  over  qi and considering  xing as  differentiated from the
mind, Wang Yangming saw the latter as indiscernible from li since, according to him, that
158Zhu Xi in Feng 1953: 556.
159Lu Xianshan's famous slogan states “The mind is Principle” (xin ji li 心即理). With regard to this statement, Liu 
(2018) explains that the Chinese character ji, even though it is usually translated as 'is', does not express 
identification, but rather inseparability.
160Chan 1967: 62.
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which  is  perceived  by  the  mind is  precisely  the  pattern  of  the  principle  and of  moral
paradigms embedded within it. This is why Lu Xiangshan considered moral knowledge as
innate in human beings: “Principle is endowed in me by Heaven, not drilled into me by
outside.”161 And again:
Moral  Principles  inherent  in  the  human mind are  endowed by Heaven and
cannot be wiped out.  Those who are beclouded by material  desires so as to
pervert principles and violate righteousness, do so because they do not think,
that is all. If they can truly examine themselves and think, their sense of right
and wrong and their choice between right and wrong will have the qualities of
quiet alertness, clear-cut intelligence, and firm conviction.162
Lu's view on human direct capacity for moral knowledge has been developed by Wang into
a theory of innate knowing (liangzhi 良知 ) based on an inborn mental/spiritual lucidity
(lingming 靈明).163
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Lu-Wang's  emphasis  on  the  subjective  direct  access
to/origin of  moral principles is not based on people's collective determination of those
principles, but rather on the shared capacity of human mind to perceive moral truths.164
161Liu 2018: 148.
162Liu 2018: 148.
163“What fulfills the realm between heaven and earth is simply human mind's spiritual lucidity ( lingming 靈明). 
Without this spiritual lucidity, human beings are nothing but their confinements. My spiritual lucidity is the master 
of heaven and earth, ghosts and spirits. Without my spiritual lucidity, heaven would have none to observe its height; 
without my spiritual lucidity, earth would have none to detect its depth. Without my spiritual lucidity, even ghosts 
and spirits would have no effects of felicity or misfortune, calamity or auspiciousness.” (Liu 2018: 142.)
164Liu calls the philosophical discourse advocated by the Lu-Wang school 'Humanistic Moral realism': “The objectivity
of moral truths lies not in our shared opinions but in our shared capacity of moral perception. If what we have in our 
mind s moral perception, than what is perceived is not dependent on or determined by our mind. The object of our 
moral perception is heavenly principle [tianli 天理], and heavenly principle is part of the fabric of the world. At the 
same time, even if none else has ever existed, an individual person can still be confident in his or her correctly 
perceived moral truths, because each one of us is endowed with this capacity. On this view, objectivism, 
intersubjectivism, and subjectivism are oddly merged into one.” Liu 2018: 145.
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We can now understand that the disagreement between li/xing xue and xin xue is
first and foremost a disagreement on the origin of human knowledge of and capacity for
morality.  Despite this,  they were both concerned with discussing that which is at  once
direct source to and origin of the fundamental structure of reality; such source/origin is
reminiscent  of  the  notion  of  'reason'  as  articulated  by European rationalists,  and  it  is
therefore not surprising if the authors of the Manifesto decided to translate xinxing zhi xue
as 'rationalism' – but with a clear emphasis on morality (so that xin is 'the moral mind' and
xing is 'the moral reason'165 ). Such explicit parallelism with European Rationalism will be
further discussed in chapter V.
4.3  天人合一 tian ren he yi: Unity of Heaven and Man
Right after the incipit of section VI, we find in the Manifesto that the doctrine of
Chinese Rationalism advocated by the authors provides “an explanation for the formula of
'Conformity of Virtue between Heaven and Man' [tian ren he de 天人合德] .”166 De is often
rendered as 'virtue', but it is also interpreted as 'inner power' or simply as 'power', without
specificity  of  instantiation.167 Similarly  to  the  fundamental  virtues  of  humaneness,
righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom, de is received from Heaven, but while the four
virtues emphasize normativity, power stresses agency. Zhu Xi believed that such power
should be constantly aligned with the way (dao)- or  li – by means of self-cultivation, so
that it would not be obscured by desires. The importance of eliminating selfish or harmful
desires was shared by Wang Yangming, but he went beyond the differentiations made by
165M(e) 1962: 25.
166M(e) 1962: 21.
167I maintain that it could also be conceptualized as 'power of acting', where 'acting' should be conceived as the 
production of some effect which is aligned with Dao. I believe that Sommer is adopting a similar interpretation 
when she states that “The manifestation of this inner power is marked by the ability to interact effectively with and 
transform others.” Yao 2003: 185.
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Zhu  Xi  to  advocate  for  a  restoration  of  the  fundamental  unity  proper  of  the  cosmos
(heaven, earth, and individual things). We can therefore think of the 'conformity of virtue
between heaven and man' as designating a shared participation in the all-encompassing
creative power of  the world – which,  as  we have already discussed,  according to Neo-
Confucian thinkers is derived from li. The authors of the Manifesto further argue that such
'conformity of virtue' resonates with other shared identifications between tian and ren: 
Song-Ming Confucian scholars inferred from 'The Doctrine of the Mean' their
doctrine that the Moral reason of man is the Celestial or Divine Reason (xing li
ji tian li 性理即天理); the Innate Moral mind is the Cosmic Mind (ren zhi benxin
ji tian xin 仁之本心即天理); the lucidity of human conscience is the lucidity of
the universe together with all things in it; human conscience and innate ability
manifest,therefore, the principle of 'omniscience of Heaven and omnipotence of
Earth' (qian zhi kun neng deng zhi sixiang 乾知坤能等之思想). This is the so-
called theory of 'Unity between Heaven and Man' (tian ren heyi 天人合一).168
Thus, the unity of heaven and man is the expression of the same unity of  li in both its
unified and particularized form, and such unity – according to the authors - cannot be fully
grasped without understanding the relationship between the Principle and human beings,
namely, without understanding the doctrine of the mind and the nature.
168M(e) 1962: 26.
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Conclusion
We have discussed the main philosophical notions on which the doctrine of 'Chinese
Rationalism' is  constructed and how, for a great part,  these notions are inherited from
different Neo-Confucian thinkers. Considering the epistemological and ontological value of
li and its relation to human mind and nature, it is possible to understand why the authors
of the Manifesto regarded  xinxing zhi xue  as a form of rationalism, therefore calling it
'Chinese Rationalism'.169 The notion of  li as normative principle/pattern, sometimes even
relatable  to  the  notion  of  Dao,  also  explains  why  the  authors  considered  Chinese
Rationalism as fundamental in order to understand the Unity of Heaven and Man. In the
following chapter, we will consider the reference found in the Manifesto to the philosophy
of Spinoza, and how  we can understand it as related to Chinese Rationalism.
169Hall and Ames have noticed that “Chinese ontological understandings are 'mereological'- that is, they are based 
upon a part-whole model.” (1987: 262) This is evident from our discussion about li as meaning both particular and 
common principles.
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Chapter 5
Confucian and European Rationalism:
a Cross-Cultural Dialogue
Introduction
In the previous chapter we have discussed some of the key notions on which the
philosophical framework of the Manifesto is built upon; we have also considered how those
notions, despite the authors' concern with the reconfiguration of Confucian tradition as a
whole,  are  inspired  from a  great  part  by  Neo-Confucain  thinkers.  In  the  light  of  such
framework, we shall now consider the cross-cultural significance of the authors' discourse
on Confucian 'Rationalism' (xinxing zhi xue 心性之学 ). We have already mentioned in
chapter two170 that the purpose of the authors of the Manifesto in issuing the document –
as stated in its preamble – was to bring about a better understanding of Chinese culture
and thought in Western Academia; it  is  plausible, then, that the issuing of the English
translation was of fundamental importance with regard to the project represented by the
document (and this is perhaps why “it took considerable time for translation from Chinese
into  English”).171 Considering  this,  discussions  on  the  philosophical  significance  of  the
Manifesto cannot ignore the doctrine of xingxin zhi xue, nor dismiss its English rendering
as 'Rationalism' as a mere inaccurate or misguided translation. On the contrary, precisely
because of the fact that the translation of the document was a crucial step in the author's
overall project, the English version of the Manifesto bears some important insights into its
philosophical significance. Because of these reasons, it seems more plausible to think of
170Specifically in chapter two, section two (“Conception and publication of the Manifesto”).
171M(e) 1962: 1.
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Confucian 'Rationalism' (xinxing zhi xue) as a strategic translation and, as such, bearing an
important explanatory purpose.
In  order  to  analyze  the  latter  and  better  understand the  doctrine  of  'Mind and
Nature' as 'Rationalism' it is important to consider the brief yet fundamental reference to
the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677) :
The  meaning  of  Nature  as  found  in  Greek  Stoicism,  in  modern  Romantic
literature  and  in  the  philosophy  of  Baruch  Spinoza,  bears  as  a  rule  some
profound imports which may be analogous with the Chinese word 'Hsing' [xing
性].172
Even though the reference also mentions Greek Stoicism and Romantic literature, for our
purpose we will limit our discussion to Spinoza's thought; this is because, considering the
notion  of  Confucian  'Rationalism',  it  seems important  to  understand the reasons why,
among various European rationalist thinkers173, the authors chose Spinoza. Together with
the English rendering of xinxing zhi xue, the reference to Spinoza has an important cross-
cultural explanatory function.   Given the brevity of the Manifesto and its concise content,
the reference is not further elaborated; in the light of this, the aim of this chapter is to
consider the possible reasons behind the reference to Spinoza's philosophical system and,
in particular, its similarities with Confucian Rationalism. In what follows we will briefly
discuss four main aspects of Spinoza's rationalism (with main reference to his major work,
the Ethics) that, despite undeniable cultural and philosophical differences with Confucian
tradition, can be considered as highly compatible with the doctrine of  xinxing zhi xue.
These four aspects are: 1) immanence, 2) parallelism, 3) unity of man and substance, and
172M(e) 1962: 23.
173The major theorists of European Rationalism are Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.
73
4)  extension  of  knowledge.  Through  this  analysis  I  will  argue  that,  given  the  specific
reference  to  Spinoza's  thought  and  its  compatibility  with  different  aspects  of  the
philosophical  framework  elaborated  in  the  Manifesto,  it  is  not  a  case  –  let  alone  a
mistake174 -  if the rendering of  xinxing zhi xue is precisely Rationalism (rather than, so to
say, Idealism).
5.1  Immanence
Generally meaning 'indwelling' or 'remaining within', immanence is characteristic of
both Spinoza's thought and the notion of xinxing zhi xue as articulated in the Manifesto. In
the first book of the  Ethics,  Spinoza provides a definition of God or Nature (Deus sive
Natura)  as  “an  absolutely  infinite  entity,  that  is,  a  substance  consisting  of  infinite
attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.”175 In addition to this, he
later  states  that  “Besides  God no  substance  can  exist  or  be  conceived.” 176 This  is  why
Spinoza is considered to be a monist – he believes in the existence of one (and only one)
substance, which is expressed in attributes and modes, i.e. particular beings. 177 A brief but
comprehensive description of the notion of substance being expressed in attributes and
modes is formulated by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze in his  Expressionism in
Philosophy: Spinoza (1990):
Attributes are like points of view on substance; but in the absolute limit these
points of view are no longer external, and substance contains within itself the
174When I first started researching the document I consulted with a Hong Kong based scholar who recently translated 
three sections of the Manifesto, including section VI. I became curious on why, despite the authors' rendering of 
xinxing zhi xue as Rationalism, he decided to keep a literal translation, namely, “Learning of the Mind and Nature”, 
so I asked why he decided to not maintain the original English translation. He simply replied that, according to him, 
the rendering of  xinxing zhi xue as Rationalism in the 1962 English version was a mistake. 
175E1d6. All the quotes from the Ethics throughout this chapter are from Parkinson's translation (Parkinson 2000).
176E1p14.
177In E1p25 Spinoza states: “Particular things are nothing other than the affections, i.e. the modes, of the attributes of 
God, by which the attributes of God are expressed [exprimuntur] in a certain and determinate way.”
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infinity of its points of view upon itself. Its modes are deduced from substance
as properties are  deduced from a thing's definition; but in the absolute limit,
these properties take on an infinite collective being. It is no longer a matter of
finite  understanding  deducing  properties  singly,  reflecting  on  its  object  and
explicating it by relating it to other objects. It is now the object that expresses
itself,  the  thing  itself  that  explicate  itself.  All  its  properties  then  jointly  'fall
within  an  infinite  understanding'.  So  there  is  no  question  of  deducing
Expression:  rather  it  is  expression  that  embeds  deduction  in  the  Absolute,
renders proof the direct manifestation of absolutely infinite substance.178
Spinoza's metaphysics is very complex and sophisticated, and a clear understanding of it
goes beyond the purpose of our current discussion; what we should know at present is that,
according to Spinoza, nothing transcends the one substance, and all of its manifestations
are in it (and, in a  sense, they  are  it). According to the system developed in the  Ethics
everything that is is real and manifested in reality; there are no transcendental paradigms
according  to  which  reality  should  conform,  nor  are  the  principles  that  ground  reality
outside of it.179 Considering Spinoza's absolute immanence, it is easy to understand why he
conceived human beings (and human nature) as part of Nature, or the one substance, and
therefore subjected to the same laws and dynamics governing the whole of reality. The
same  goes  for  human  emotions  which,  according  to  Spinoza,  have  been  mistreated
throughout the history of Western philosophy:
Most of those who have written about the emotions and about men's way of
178Deleuze 1990: 22.
179Chad Hansen, in his well known A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (1992), builds an important distinction 
between what he calls the “Indo-European” tradition and Chinese philosophy. The former, he argues, is grounded on
a variety of dichotomies (such as appearance/reality, reason/emotions, immanent/transcendent) which sometimes are
incommensurable and that, more importantly, are not found in Chinese thought.
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living seem not to discuss natural  things,  which follow the common laws of
Nature;  rather, they seem to discuss things that are outside Nature. Indeed,
they seem to  conceive the place  of  man  in Nature as  being like  an empire
within an empire. For they believe that man disturbs the order of Nature rather
than that he follows it, that he has an absolute power over his actions, and that
he is determined by himself alone.180
The notion of the One manifesting itself in the Many is indeed one of the notions
grounding the philosophical  framework of  the Manifesto which,  as  I  have discussed in
chapter four, is built mainly on Neo-Confucian tradition; let us recall, for example, the
Neo-Confucian slogan “Principle is one but its manifestations are many” (li yi wan shu 理
一萬殊 ) already mentioned in our discussion on  li 理 .  Similarly to Spinoza's notion of
naturalism181,  Neo-Confucian  thinkers  did  not  conceive  the  principle  as  manifesting
uniquely in human nature, but rather in the whole of reality:
Question: 'How is that dried up withered things also possess the nature [xing
性]?'
Answer: 'For them there has been from the beginning such a Principle [li 理].
Therefore it is said that in the universe there is no single thing that lies beyond
the nature [xing 性].' As he walked on the steps, (the Master then) said: 'The
bricks of these steps have within them the Principle [li 理 ] that pertains to
bricks.' And sitting down, he said: 'This bamboo chair has within it the Principle
pertaining to bamboo chairs.'
180E3 Preface.
181Spinoza's naturalism is not one that draws a contrast between the natural and the supernatural, and this is also why, 
according to the authors of the Manifesto, his concept of nature can be compared to theirs. They themselves warn us 
in the Manifesto that “It would be completely wrong to treat the Chinese xinxing 心性 principles in terms of Western
naturalism as contrast to the supernatural.” M(e) 1962: 23.
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Question: 'Principle is received from Heaven by both men and other creatures
alike. But do inanimate things also possess Principle?'
Answer: 'Certainly they possess Principle. For example, (the Principle of) a boat
is that it can move only on water; of a cart, that it can move only on land.'182
The manifestation of Principle in the nature of particular beings is a clear affirmation of
naturalistic immanence. From the latter derives a conception of perfection which seems to
be shared by both Neo-Confucian thinkers and Spinoza's rationalism. This can be seen by
making  a  parallelism  between  the  two  statements:  “All  Principles  are  complete  in
themselves.”183 and “By reality and perfection I understand the same.”184
The lack of an absolute separation between the immanent and the transcendental was
discussed by New Confucian thinkers as 'immanent transcendence' (neizai chaoyue 內在超
越)185, an example of which is found in the Manifesto itself:
The morality of which Chinese Confucian speaks is rooted in their concept of
'mind and human nature' [reason] (xinxing 心性). But this human nature is the
same as the heavenly principle (tianli 天理), and this (human) mind is connected
with the heavenly mind. Thus this mind and this human nature are the heavenly
mind and the heavenly principle.186
The immanent character of morality, thus, lies in the fact that it is human as much as it is
proper of heavenly principle. Ultimately, morality is immanent because of its naturalistic
character;  according  to  the  authors  of  the  Manifesto,  in  fact,  moral  principles  are
182Zhu Xi in Feng 1953: 535-536.
183Cheng Yi in Feng 1953: 501.
184E2d6. See also the preface to E3: “Nothing happens in Nature which can be ascribed to a defect in it.”
185Pohl 2016: 105.
186Pohl 2016: 105. (Pohl is here reporting Zhang junmai's translation of the Manifesto in Zhang 1962.)
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embedded within the structure of reality, therefore they are found in man because they are
found in the whole of cosmos, so that “Nature and human nature are two in one”.187
5.2  Parallelism
Another philosophical issue that the authors of the Manifesto might have recognized
in Spinoza's philosophy as somehow similar to that developed in their own reading of Neo-
Confucianism is the idea of parallelism. We have already discussed in the previous chapter
the dialectic between Principle (li) and vital energy (qi), which is concisely explained in the
following statement by Zhu Xi:
What  are  called  principle  and  qi are  certainly  two  different  entities.  But
considered from the standpoint of things, the two entities are merged one with
the other and cannot be separated with each other in a different place. However,
this does not destroy the fact that the two entities are each an entity in itself.
When considered from the standpoint of principle, before things existed, their
principles of being had already existed. Only their principles existed, however,
but not yet the things themselves.188
Zhu Xi here clearly explains that  li  and qi are separate entities that should, therefore, be
conceived as (theoretically) independent from each other. However,  considered from the
standpoint of things, that is – in existence – li  and qi are merged in particular beings as
one entity. And again:
187M(e) 1962: 18.
188Zhu Xi in Liu 2018: 98.
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There is Principle before there can be Ether (qi). But it is only when there is
Ether, that Principle has a place in which to rest. This fact applies to the coming
into existence of all (things), whether as large as Heaven and Earth, or as tiny as
the cricket or ant.189
Once again we see how, even though Zhu Xi does prioritize the existence of li as necessarily
prior to  qi, the two entities proceed in parallel with regard to the existence of particular
beings.
This  dialectic  between  li and  qi seems to  share  some important  similarities  with
Spinoza's  theory  of  parallelism  of  attributes.  In  E2p7  he  states  that  “The  order  and
connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things.”  Spinoza's
parallelism follows from his substance monism. In order to understand how, let us look at
a specific example: the relationship of mind and body. In the Ethics, Spinoza explains that
mind and body are manifestations of respectively the attribute of thought and the attribute
of  extension.  The  notion  of  'attribute'  is  relatively  common  in  Western  philosophical
tradition; in the specific context of Spinoza's philosophy, attributes are “that which the
intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence.”190 As mentioned earlier, God
(or substance) consists of infinite attributes191, each of which “must be conceived through
itself.”192 First, we should note that even though substance is made of infinite attributes,
human beings (as finite and determinate beings) can only perceive two, namely, thought
and extension. Secondly, similarly to qi and li, thought and extension are to be considered
separately and independently; however, since they are the expression of the one substance,
attributes proceed in parallel  so that “the order  of  ideas is  the  same as  the order and
189Zhu Xi in Feng 1953: 539 (emphasis mine).
190E1d4.
191E1d6. Even though the substance consists of infinite attributes, human beings seem to be able to conceive only two: 
the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension.
192E1p10. 
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connection of things.” According to Spinoza, then, mind and body are one and the same
thing conceived through different attributes.193 
In the Manifesto there is no explicit mention of the mind/body parallelism; nevertheless,
the latter seems to be discussed in terms of 'inward' and 'outward', so that according to the
authors:
By  the  learning  of  Moral  Mind  and  Moral  Reason  (xinxing  zhi  xue)  man's
outward actions  are  all  referred to,  and directed toward the  achievement  of
internal, spiritual activities. They are all likewise directed toward the celestial
virtues  in  assisting  the  transformation  and  nourishment  of  the  Powers  of
Heaven and Earth. Chinese Rationalism, therefore, is an ideological hinge upon
which the man's internal life is his outward life and the universe.194
Beside the similarities between the li/qi dialectic and the parallelism of attributes we
should  note  an  important  general  difference  between  the  two  cases.  According  to  the
philosophical framework upon which the Manifesto develops (with particular reference to
the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi) li has a certain priority over qi – even though the two
are  merged into  one entity  in  the  existence and manifestation  of  particular  beings.  In
Spinoza's parallelism, on the other hand, there is no theoretical or practical precedence of
the attribute of thought over the attribute of extension.
5.3  Unity of Heaven and Man, Unity of Substance and Modes
With  specific  regard  to  the  notion  of  human  nature,  we  can  identify  a  third
characteristic  shared  by  the  philosophical  framework  of  the  Manifesto  and  Spinoza's
193Descartes (1596-1650), the prominent rationalist preceding Spinoza, could not theorize such parallelism since, 
according to him, mind and body were incommensurable substances that, as such, could not possibly interact.
194M(e) 1962: 26.
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system, namely , the unity of Heaven and man195 (or, in Spinoza's view, the unity of God
and man). It is undeniable that there are major differences between the Confucian notion
of Heaven (tian  天 ) and Spinoza's  notion of substance or God; for the purpose of our
analysis, in fact, we are not interested in comparing these per se, but rather we should look
at the idea of unity that they involve in the context of the two philosophical traditions here
considered.  In the Manifesto, we find the following statement:
By exerting the moral mind [xin 心] to understand the moral reason [xing 性],
one  might  be  able  to  understand  Heaven  [tian  天 ]  or  the  Heavenly  Way
[tiandao  天道 ];  by cherishing well  the mind and nourishing the reason one
might thereby attend to Heaven. It is said that human moral reason is precisely
Heavenly reason [tianli  天理 ], and human virtues [de 德 ] coincides with the
celestial  virtues  [tiande 天 德 ];  all  human  event  performed  for  the  full
development of moral reason [xingli 性理], with the accomplishment of virtuous
deeds,  can  assist  the  transforming  and  flourishing  influence  of  Heaven  and
Earth. Hence, Song-Ming Confucian scholars inferred from The Doctrine of the
Mean [Zhongyong 中庸 ] their  doctrine that the moral  reason of man is the
celestial or divine reason; the innate moral heart-mind is the cosmic mind; the
lucidity of human conscience is the lucidity of the universe together with all
things in it; human conscience and innate ability manifest, therefore […] the so-
called theory of 'Unity of Heaven and Man' [tian ren heyi 天人合一].196
195Already discussed in chapter four section three.
196M(e) 1962: 25-26. This passage of the Manifesto seems to be recalling a passage from Zhang Zai's Western 
Inscription (Ximing 西銘): “Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an
intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the 
universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.” in Pohl 
2016: 115.
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We find the same idea expressed by Cheng Yi in his statement “Nature is Principle” (xing ji
li 性即理).197 The unity of Heaven and man emphasizes the moral nature of human beings
by connecting it to the Principle as morally normative (whether it is tianli or li), and this is
why in the passage mentioned above, the authors also include the notion of virtue (de).
In Spinoza, on the other hand, we do not find the same emphasis on moral principles
that Neo-Confucian thinkers assign to their metaphysics, but we do find a notion of unity
between man and substance (God). This is already clearly stated throughout the first book
of the Ethics, but it is particularly explicit in two statements: 1) “God is the efficient cause,
not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.”198; 2) “Particular things are
nothing other than the affections, i.e. the modes, of the attributes of God, by which the
attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate way.”199 Considering this, we
can already understand the overall unity of substance and particular beings characterizing
Spinoza's system: in this framework, human beings ('modes') are both  in the substance
(since nothing exists outside God) and, in a certain way, they also  are substance (since
they  are  a  finite  and  determinate  manifestation  of  it).  The  Ethics does  not  provide
guidance with regard to specific sets of moral principles, but rather, it aims at providing a
more  general  guidance  for  human  flourishing  in  the  context  of  Nature  and  natural
principles.200 Thus,  Spinoza  acknowledges  the  undeniable  differences  that  we  find  in
human beings' beliefs and behaviors:
For although human bodies agree in many things, they also disagree in very
many things, and so what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems
197Wood in Cua  2003: 699
198E1p25.
199E1p25c.
200Broadly speaking, this brings some echoes of the Confucian notion of self-cultivation.
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ordered  to  one  seems  confused  to  another;  what  is  pleasant  to  one  seems
unpleasant to another -and so with other things, which I pass by here, both
because this is not the place to discuss these at length, and because everyone
has sufficient experience of  this.  For everybody says  that  there are  as many
heads as there are opinions, that everyone is full of his own wisdom, and that as
brains differ, so do tastes. These sayings show sufficiently that human beings
judge about things in accordance with the disposition of their brain, and that
they imagine things rather than understand them.201
From this, however, does not follow that Spinoza did not treat the notions of 'good' and
'bad'  as  normative,  on  the  contrary,  a  fundamental  idea  of  his  project  is  to  provide  a
practical and functional definition of the two, rather than an absolute one:
I shall understand by 'good' that which we know wit certainty to be a means by
which we may approach more and more closely that exemplar of human nature
which we set before ourselves. By 'bad' I shall understand that which we know
with certainty to hinder us from reaching that exemplar. Then we shall say that
men are more or less perfect as they approach this exemplar more or less.202
The notion of 'good' and 'bad' articulated by Spinoza should not be understood as relativist,
but  rather  as  contextualized.  In  this  sense,  men and women should understand moral
principles in the context of  the exemplar of their  nature,  which is  derivative from and
dependent upon its ground and source: the one substance, or God.
201E1 Appendix.
202E4 Preface.
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5.4  Extension of knowledge and its practice
We shall  now look at  one last,  yet  fundamental,  characteristic which seems to be
shared by both the philosophical discourse articulated in the Manifesto and Spinoza: the
importance of knowledge as source of practical orientation. Let us consider this first in the
context  of  the  Spinozistic  world.  Spinoza  (and,  in  this  case,  European  rationalism  in
general) relies upon the principle of sufficient reason; this means that, according to him,
there are no brute facts – since everything that is has a reason for its existence. Thus, it is
fundamental  for  human  beings  to  understand  the  causal  relations  in  which  reality  is
embedded and produced or, to use Spinoza's terminology, it is fundamental for them to
form  'adequate  ideas'  about  the  world  and  themselves.  He  notes,  however,  that  we
generally lack a clear understanding of the principles and dynamics governing reality and,
as a consequence, we tend to form 'inadequate ideas', which can lead us to misunderstand
a cause for its effect and vice versa. In other words, Spinoza thinks that we generally do not
understand ourselves and the world we live in. The Ethics even provides a critique to three
examples (defined by Deleuze as the three illusions)203 of how men have institutionalized
their own misunderstandings: first, God does not possess a will to be worshiped, and has
not created the universe to please men – he simply is the first cause of everything; second,
in Nature there are no such things as final causes - they are a mere inventions on the part
of  human  beings;  third,  through  a  misunderstanding  of  causal  relations,  men  take
themselves as the absolute first cause of their actions and misunderstand the relations they
are bound to, believing then in absolute free will.204 A misunderstanding of the structure
and dynamics of reality can lead to serious consequences, as described by Spinoza himself:
203Deleuze 1988.
204These are, according to Deleuze, the theological illusion, the illusion of final causes, and the illusion of free decrees.
Deleuze 1988: 20.
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I do not doubt that all those who judge about things in a confused way, and have
not become used to knowing things through their primary causes, will find it
difficult to grasp the demonstration of Prop. 7.205 This is because they do not
distinguish  between  the  modifications  of  substances  and  the  substances
themselves, and do not know how things are produced. So it comes about that
they ascribe to substances the beginning that they see that natural things have.
For those who are ignorant of the true causes of things confuse everything, and
without any mental  aversion they suppose trees as well  as  human beings to
speak, and imagine human beings to be formed from stones as well  as from
semen, and any forms to be changed into any others. So also those who confuse
the divine nature with human nature readily ascribe human emotions to God,
especially as long as they are also ignorant of the way in which emotions are
produced in the mind.206
It should be noted that in Spinoza's system, misunderstanding human nature for the divine
nature ultimately means for human beings to consider themselves as first cause of their
existence  and actions.  Such  misconception  leads  to  decontextualize  the  very  notion  of
human  nature,  namely,  to  consider  it  independently  from  that  of  substance.  This
misconception  can  eventually  hinder  the  real  power  of  the  mind  which,  according  to
Spinoza,  consists  in “the power of thinking and forming adequate ideas”207,  namely,  to
grasp true knowledge of the nature of things as well  as the connections between them.
Importantly, the value of such knowledge lies in its practical guidance: since, as already
mentioned, “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of
things”, adequate knowledge results in adequate practice.
205Proposition 7 (E1) states: “It belongs to the nature of substance to exists.”
206E1p8s2.
207E5p4.
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Even though Neo-Confucian and New Confucian thinkers did not formulate or rely
upon a  formal  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  we  can still  find some similarities  in  the
following statements from Cheng Yi:
All  things in the world may be understood through Principle.  There being a
thing, there must also be a pattern for it. Each individual thing must have its
individual principle.208
The sage's ability to give orderly coordination to all things does not derive from
an ability to create the patterns for these things. It lies simply in the fact that to
each he gives its proper place.209 
Since each individual thing has its own Principle which is manifested in its own nature, the
ability of the sage lies in a proper understanding of it. A sage knows, for example, that the
abilities of a minister should not be judged by his abilities to cook, in the same way the
abilities of a cook should not be judged from his bureaucratic knowledge. The importance
of adequate knowledge of the nature of things for Neo-Confucian thinkers is summarized
by  the  notion  of  “extension  of  knowledge”  (zhizhi 致知 ),  already  found  in  the  Great
Learning (Daxue 大学), and commented by Zhu Xi as follows:
If  we  wish  to  extend  our  knowledge  to  the  utmost,  we  must  investigate
exhaustively the li of things...It is only because we have not exhausted the li of all
208Cheng Yi in Feng 1953: 503.
209Cheng Yi in Feng 1953: 503.
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things that our knowledge is still incomplete.210
All  this  considered,  we  can  see  how  Neo-Confucian  thinkers,  similarly  to  Spinoza,
considered  adequate  knowledge  of  reality  as  fundamental  to  and  intertwined  with
adequate practice. This is clearly stated in section VI of the Manifesto, where knowledge of
morality and daily practice should be conceived as informing one another:
Practice must arise out of consciousness of one's moral tenets, and in turn such
consciousness might also be increased through regular practice. Consciousness
and practice thus make parallel progress. […] In case practice is weakened one
degree,  consciousness  and  actual  understanding  will  also  decrease
proportionately.211
Indeed, such practical orientation is a fundamental feature shared by both philosophical
traditions: the metaphysics of  li  , similarly to Spinoza's metaphysics, has the function of
providing guidance  for  human beings  in  living their  lives  according to  the  norms and
principles  grounding the  whole  of  reality,  that  is,  guidance regarding the  creation and
preservation  of  harmony.  Ultimately,  the  nature  of  things  in  both  traditions  has  the
fundamental value of explaining ontological dependence (of modes on the substance and
of  particular  li(s)  on a  unified  li)  and epistemic  access  (the  possibility  of  gaining true
knowledge).
210Cua 2003: 632.
211M(e) 1962: 24.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have individuated four main aspects which seem to be shared by
both Confucian thinkers and a prominent figure of European Rationalism. The discussion
was meant to provide possible reasons for both the reference to Spinoza in the text of the
Manifesto and, more importantly, for the rendering of xinxing zhi xue as 'Rationalism'. We
have seen that  despite notable cultural  and philosophical  differences between the two
traditions,  it  is  still  plausible to think that the authors of  the Manifesto employed this
cross-cultural reference as explanatory device for the establishment of a dialogue between
commensurable notions of 'reason'.
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Conclusion
It  is  undeniable  that  a  main  concern  for  the  authors  of  the  Manifesto  was  the
reconfiguration of Chinese thought, and in particular of Confucianism, in the light of the
challenges encountered during China's Republican period and Maoist era. I have discussed
the general framework of Chinese cultural conservatism in order to highlight that New
Confucianism represents a specific intellectual stream of such broader framework. After
assessing the historical and cultural context in which the Manifesto was conceived and
eventually issued, we have seen how the author's shared concern was the reconfiguration
of Confucian tradition in the 20th century, in order to both reevaluate its place in China's
modernisation and affirm its cross-cultural significance. Despite the great variety of topics
discussed  in  the  Manifesto,  the  doctrine  of  Chinese  Rationalism  -  the  authors  state  -
should be  understood as  the  core  of  Chinese thought.  With regard to  the  comparative
reading of both the Chinese and the English text of the document, I have argued that the
rendering of  xinxing zhi xue  心性之学 (literally 'the study of heart-mind and nature') as
'Rationalism' makes sense. Considering the notions on which the latter is based (those of
nature, heart-mind and principle, as analyzed in chapter four), together with the reference
to Spinoza's rationalism, it is possible that the authors of the Manifesto wanted to operate
a  conceptual  translation  by  means  of  family  resemblance.  The  concept  of  family
resemblance  is  often  used  in  cross-cultural  philosophy  in  order  to  relate  different
traditions of thought while highlighting similar patterns, and respecting philosophical and
cultural differences at the same time. This concept is introduced by Austrian philosopher
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in his posthumous Philosophical Investigations (1953):
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities that “family
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resemblance”;  for  the  various  resemblances  between members  of  a  family  –
build,  features,  colour  of  eyes,  gait,  temperament,  and so on and so forth –
overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a family.
And likewise the kinds of numbers, for example, form a family. Why do we call
something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it has a – direct – affinity with
several things that have hitherto been called “number”; and this can be said to
give it an indirect affinity with other things that we also call “numbers”. And we
extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fiber to fiber.
And the strength of the thread resides not in the fact that some one fiber run
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibers. But if someone
wanted  to  say,  “So  there  is  something  common to  all  these  constructions  –
namely the disjunction of all their common properties” - I'd reply: “Now you are
only playing with a word. One might as well say, “There is a Something that runs
throughout the  whole  thread – namely,  the  continuous overlapping of  these
fibers”.212
The idea of a family resemblance between Confucian and European Rationalism is very
helpful in understanding the philosophical project of the Manifesto. The point is not to
identify  Confucian notions with European notions,  nor to confuse and blur undeniable
distinctions. Rather, the point seems to be a pattern of overlapping concepts surrounding
both European and Chinese notions of  'reason'  and 'rationality'.  In other words,  when
writing about Confucian (or 'Chinese') Rationalism, the authors are not merely 'speaking
Western' for the sake of doing it: they are actually establishing a cross-cultural dialogue
based on shared  philosophical  concerns  related to  notions  of  'reason'  that  touch  upon
ontological, metaphysical and ethical issues.
212Wittgenstein 2009: 37.
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All  this  considered,  this  research argues that the philosophical  significance of the
Manifesto lies precisely in this: it sheds light on a family resemblance between Confucian
and Western notions which, despite their overlapping patterns, remain to be questioned.
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